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ITH some justification, the scholarly consensus holds that 
the modern era of federal immigration law in the United 
States began in 1875.1 That was, after all, the year in which Con-
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1 See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625, 1626 
(1992); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the 
PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP 3/18/2010  12:47 PM 
360 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:359 
 
gress enacted general restrictions on the ability of foreigners to en-
ter the country,2 although restrictions at the state and local level 
had been around for much longer.3 Convention also dates the ori-
gin of the federal constitutional law of immigration to roughly the 
same period. In the Chinese Exclusion Case, announced at the 
height of the nativism of the 1880s, the Supreme Court upheld the 
power of Congress to restrict entry by Chinese nationals.4 Identify-
ing the nation’s power to control its borders as an inherent incident 
of sovereignty under the law of nations, the Court found that this 
power to exclude aliens seeking entry was not subject to any consti-
tutional restriction.5 Thus was born the plenary power doctrine. In 
relatively short order, the Court extended the plenary power doc-
trine to encompass Congress’s power to provide for the deporta-
tion of previously admitted resident aliens as well.6
As with their view of its nineteenth-century origins, scholars to-
day also agree that the plenary power doctrine provides a poorly 
theorized framework for immigration constitutionalism.7 Under the 
Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 1004 (1998) [hereinafter Neuman, Habeas 
Corpus] (dating the modern period of federal immigration regulation to 1875). 
2 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477–78 (excluding prostitutes and 
convicts from admission to the United States). 
3 As Professor Neuman shows, restrictions had long been around at both the state 
and local levels. See Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, 
Borders, and Fundamental Law 19–43 (1996) [hereinafter Neuman, Strangers] (noting 
the myth that the nation’s borders were open until the 1870s and recounting the vari-
ous forms of legislation, often at the state and local level, that served to exclude alien 
criminals, paupers, the diseased, and people of color). Federal laws adopted before 
1875 also excluded slaves, “coolies,” and perhaps some free people of color to the ex-
tent already barred by state law. Id. at 34–41. 
4 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
609 (1889). 
5 Id. 
6 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 723–24 (1893). We discuss Chae 
Chan Ping, Fong Yue Ting, and the origins of the plenary power doctrine at greater 
length in Part IV. For comprehensive treatment of the plenary power doctrine, see 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and 
America 181 (1987) (tracing the origins of plenary power to the Passenger Cases, 48 
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle 
of Plenary Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255, 256–57 [hereinafter Legomsky, Plenary 
Power]. 
7 See Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra note 6, at 260–78 (criticizing as inadequate a 
series of possible justifications for the plenary power doctrine); see also Louis Hen-
kin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion 
and its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 885–86 (1987) (arguing that the Court’s rec-
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plenary power doctrine, Congress enjoys what the Supreme Court 
has sometimes described as essentially unfettered power over the 
treatment of aliens. In its baldest formulation, the plenary power 
doctrine holds that certain categories of aliens must accept what-
ever rights Congress chooses to confer or withhold.8 At the same 
time, the Court has often subjected the removal or deportation of 
aliens and other features of immigration law to some of the rigors 
of procedural due process analysis.9 Perhaps most dramatically, the 
Court held in 2001 that aliens were entitled to a presumption 
against retroactivity and to judicial review of removal decisions de-
spite the efforts of Congress to impose a different dispensation.10 
The Court framed its approach to the legislation in terms of the 
need to avoid the serious constitutional question that would arise 
from foreclosure of all review.11 Subsequent decisions, including 
those growing out of challenges to detention at Guantanamo Bay, 
ognition of unfettered power in Congress was contrary both to norms of limited con-
stitutionalism and to the human rights commitments that defined our highest national 
aspirations); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the 
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 105–06 (1998) (arguing that substantive 
due process principles should limit Congress’s ability under the plenary power doc-
trine to impose retroactive changes in immigration law); Motomura, supra note 1, at 
1626–32 (arguing for an alternative set of constitutional norms, drawn from special 
rules of statutory interpretation and from the rules of procedural due process that the 
Court has grudgingly made available to aliens seeking to resist removal); cf. Ann 
Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 Geo. L.J. 
1015, 1018–19 (2006) (exploring the nineteenth-century development of the presump-
tion in favor of prospective legislation as it applied to public and private rights). 
8 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–32 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 588–90 (1952); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713–14; Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609; see also United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (declaring that any pro-
cedure Congress chooses “is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned”). 
9 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982) (extending procedural protec-
tions to a resident alien who was excluded upon his return to the United States after a 
short trip abroad). 
10 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314–20 (2001) (concluding that Congress had not 
clearly stated its intention to preclude review of certain removal issues through ha-
beas corpus). 
11 See id. at 300–05. We discuss St. Cyr in Part IV below. 
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have strengthened the Court in its view that constitutional guaran-
tees provide aliens with some assurance of judicial review.12
Complicating matters further, the Court has sometimes sug-
gested that immigration matters fall within the scope of something 
called the “public rights” exception to Article III.13 The well-known 
terms of Article III vest the judicial power of the United States in 
federal courts, supreme and inferior, staffed by life-tenured and 
salary-protected judges.14 Under the public rights exception as 
sometimes articulated, Congress has the power to allow non-
Article III tribunals to adjudicate and resolve disputes between in-
dividuals and the federal government. If rigorously applied, the 
public rights doctrine would seemingly authorize Congress to as-
sign the adjudication of immigration matters to executive branch 
agencies and to immunize agency decisions from judicial review. 
Strong statements of the public rights exception to Article III draw 
strength from the plenary power doctrine but conflict with the 
Court’s reliance on procedural due process and habeas corpus as 
complementary tools with which to preserve judicial oversight.15
Scholars have called attention to the puzzles presented by the 
Court’s distinction between constitutional substance and constitu-
tional procedure and the complicating niceties of the public rights 
doctrine. Professor Daniel Meltzer, writing in the wake of the im-
migration reforms of the mid-1990s, described the uneasy world 
that the Court had created with its deference on matters of sub-
stance and its closer attention to issues of procedure. How did it 
12 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that Congress un-
constitutionally suspended writ of habeas corpus in restricting judicial review of a 
Guantanamo Bay detention). 
13 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (including immigration among mat-
ters “involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial 
power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determina-
tion, but which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of 
the United States, as it may deem proper” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken 
Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855))). 
14 On the power of Congress to assign matters within the judicial power of the 
United States to non-Article III tribunals, see James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, 
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 
649–51 (2004); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agen-
cies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 916–18 (1988) (arguing that Article III re-
quires federal courts to conduct appellate review of legislative court judgments and 
administrative agencies). 
15 We criticize the plenary power doctrine in Part IV below. 
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happen, Professor Meltzer wondered, that the federal government 
came to be bound by the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause in 
dealing with aliens but not by the same Amendment’s equal pro-
tection component?16 Similarly, Professor Hiroshi Motomura has 
ruminated at some length about the Court’s distinction between 
substance and procedure. Describing what he called a procedural 
due process exception to the plenary power doctrine, Professor 
Motomura viewed procedural protections as surrogates for the 
substantive constitutional rights that the Court has so far largely 
declined to recognize.17
The case of the Uighurs, long detained at Guantanamo Bay, il-
lustrates some of the perplexing consequences of our substantively 
thin and procedurally thick immigration Constitution. The Bush 
administration detained the Uighurs after learning that some may 
have received military training at camps run by the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan. Eventually it appeared that at least some of the Uighurs, 
an ethnic minority in China, secured this training not to attack the 
United States but to defend themselves against the Chinese gov-
ernment. Through the ups and downs of habeas litigation, counsel 
for the Uighurs eventually established the elements of a claim for 
release from detention at Guantanamo Bay.18 Despite the efforts of 
a federal district judge who viewed their continued detention as 
unjustifiable, the government successfully argued that the Uighurs 
had no right to admission to the United States.19 The constitutional 
16 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. 
L.J. 2537, 2578–79 (1998). 
17 See Motomura, supra note 1, at 1632–35. Taking a slightly different tack, Profes-
sor Nancy Morawetz has argued that substantive due process may limit Congress’s 
ability to impose retroactive changes in immigration law. Morawetz, supra note 7, at 
105–06. 
18 For an account of the events up to and including the district court’s order to re-
lease the Uighurs into the United States, see In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litiga-
tion, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008). 
19  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1025–29 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (concluding that 
Uighurs cannot claim release from custody, despite the government’s admission that 
they do not qualify for continued detention as enemy combatants), cert. granted, 130 
S. Ct. 458 (Oct. 20, 2009). Various developments may moot the Kiyemba litigation 
before its anticipated judicial resolution in June 2010.  See Order in Pending Case, 
Kiyemba v. Obama (08-1234) (Feb. 12, 2010). 
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invalidity of their confinement at Guantanamo Bay did not trans-
late into a constitutional right to enter the United States.20
This Article offers a new account of the nation’s immigration 
Constitution. Instead of building on the plenary power doctrine of 
the 1880s, the Article focuses on the little-known body of federal 
immigration and naturalization law that arose during the early Re-
public of the 1790s. Although it has for a variety of reasons at-
tracted little attention from scholars, the constitutional law of the 
early Republic recognized that Congress was to have broad (sub-
stantive) power to fashion immigration policy but was required to 
act in accordance with norms of procedural regularity. In particu-
lar, while Congress was free to define the classes of persons who 
were entitled to seek naturalized citizenship, the Constitution re-
quires Congress to act in accordance with norms of prospectivity, 
uniformity, and transparency. Embedded in the naturalization 
clause, which empowers Congress to “establish an uniform rule of 
Naturalization,”21 these values of procedural regularity formed the 
core of the early Republic’s immigration Constitution and can do 
much to complement the procedural protections found in the due 
process clause. 
A range of factors explains why this body of constitutional law 
has escaped sustained attention. To begin with, the constitutional 
law of the early Republic was largely applied in the halls of Con-
gress, rather than in the federal courts. Early federal laws imple-
menting the requirement of a uniform rule of naturalization pro-
duced little in the way of reported decisions that would shed light 
on the judiciary’s role in the process or on the constitutional 
framework within which Congress was to operate.22 Like much of 
the early Republic’s administrative law, the application of immigra-
tion and naturalization law was hidden in the discretionary actions 
20 During June 2009, the Obama administration secured asylum for the Uighurs in 
such disparate countries as Bermuda, Palau, and elsewhere. See William Glaberson, 6 
Guantánamo Detainees Are Released to Other Countries as Questions Linger, N.Y. 
Times, June 12, 2009, at A6. 
21 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
22 In one little known case, Ex parte Fitzbonne (1800) (unreported), the Supreme 
Court held that citizens of France were entitled to naturalization, notwithstanding a 
provision of federal law barring naturalization of citizens of a country at war with the 
United States. For an account, see 8 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, 1789–1800, at 389–90 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2007). 
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of government officers, mainly judges and magistrates.23 Apart 
from its being invisible to an eye trained to examine judicial deci-
sions, the early constitutional law was built around the naturaliza-
tion clause, a seemingly unlikely source for the development of a 
constitutional law of immigration. The clause itself occasioned little 
debate at the Philadelphia Convention that would shed light on its 
important procedural features. In addition, the clause does not ob-
viously extend beyond issues of citizenship to govern issues of im-
migration. Scholars who date federal immigration law to 1875 cor-
rectly identify general congressional restrictions on entry; early 
citizenship rules did not bar anyone from entering the country.24
But two factors—the practical reality of trans-Atlantic migration 
and the rules of property ownership—combined to make naturali-
zation virtually synonymous with the immigration policy of the 
early Republic.25 The trans-Atlantic voyage to the United States 
23 On the sources of antebellum administrative law, see William J. Novak, The Peo-
ple’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 9–12 (1996). 
Rarely would the published judicial record reveal the factors that influenced citizen-
ship decisions; rarely did first-instance decisions occasion appellate review; and rarely 
did the courts record their legal interpretations in passing on naturalization petitions. 
For instance, naturalization decisions of the district court of New York simply recite 
the facts and declare the petitioner to be a naturalized citizen. See infra note 155. 
24 Chief Justice Taney, dissenting from the invalidation of state restrictions on the 
entry of aliens, gave voice to the intuitive distinction between citizenship and immi-
gration. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 483 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that the “nature of our institutions under the Federal government 
made it a matter of absolute necessity that [the naturalization] power should be con-
fided to the government of the Union, where all the States were represented, and 
where all had a voice; a necessity so obvious that no statesman could have overlooked 
it. The article has nothing to do with the admission or rejection of aliens, nor with 
immigration, but with the rights of citizenship. Its sole object was to prevent one State 
from forcing upon all the others, and upon the general government, persons as citi-
zens whom they were unwilling to admit as such.”). 
25 For the view that the length, cost, and difficulty of the trans-Atlantic voyage en-
sured that it was “almost always a one-way trip,” see Raymond L. Cohn, Mass Migra-
tion Under Sail: European Immigration to the Antebellum United States 1, 10 (2009). 
Cohn observed that later in the nineteenth century, steamship travel shortened the 
trip from months to some ten days and sharply reduced its cost. Id. at 1, 12, 125, 223–
26. The change in the cost and mode of travel may have changed the nature of immi-
gration. While immigrants in the age of sail could not practically consider anything 
but permanent relocation, the steamship enabled immigrants to come and go. William 
J. Bromwell, History of Immigration to the United States 18 (1856) (reporting that 
the emigration of Chinese to America was inconsiderable until 1854, when some 
13,000 Chinese laborers arrived, and noting that a growing number of immigrants 
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from Europe was difficult, expensive, and time consuming. Immi-
grants spent anywhere from six weeks to three months on board a 
ship, paid substantial fees to book the passage, and did not expect 
to return to their countries of origin.26 Scholarship on immigration 
during the founding period thus makes clear that those sailing to 
the new world were (almost invariably) making a permanent deci-
sion to relocate.27 The rules of property ownership explain why 
those contemplating a one-way trip to the United States would 
have paid close attention to naturalization rules in making their 
decision. At common law, in England and in the colonies, and 
newly independent states of North America, aliens could not ob-
tain a fee simple title to real property.28 While there were various 
ways to temporize—aliens could obtain “denizen” status, for ex-
ample, and the right to hold a life estate in real property—the 
common law barrier to land ownership played a central role in im-
migration calculus.29 Inasmuch as the prospect of owning cheap fer-
tile land was central to the pre-industrial American dream of eco-
nomic advancement, immigrants to British North America during 
the second half of the eighteenth century would know that their fu-
ture property ownership rights depended on their ability to secure 
naturalized citizenship.30
came with the intention of returning to their country of origin rather than residing 
permanently in the United States). 
 For an account of common law property ownership rights in England, see 2 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *356–57. On the way prevailing 
conceptions of property rights affected aliens in colonial America, see Polly J. Price, 
Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the Relative 
Autonomy Paradigm, 43 Am. J. Legal Hist. 152, 159 (1999) (noting that aliens could 
not inherit land from others and could not pass good title to their children upon 
death; even their ownership of property during their lifetimes was subject to attack by 
way of escheat, a state-initiated legal process that triggered the forfeiture of title to 
the state). 
26 See supra note 25. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 On the nature of alien property disabilities and the Crown’s practice of deniza-
tion, see 2 Blackstone, supra note 25, at *356–57 and infra notes 73–80 and accompa-
nying text. 
30 See Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America 
on the Eve of the Revolution 26 (1986). Bailyn emphasizes both the comparatively 
vast scale of immigration in the years between 1760 and 1775 and the way in which 
the pre-industrial immigration of the eighteenth century differed from its nineteenth-
century counterpart. As Bailyn explains, immigration was not, “in its main impact, an 
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For the Framers, then, the law of naturalization played a central 
role in structuring the incentives and decisions of prospective im-
migrants.31 We can see the connection between property owner-
ship, naturalization policy, and immigration in a variety of sources, 
including the population grievance in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. In complaining that the King had acted to prevent the 
population of the United States, Congress first identified acts that 
were said to have obstructed “the Laws for Naturalization of For-
eigners.”32 Without the promise of naturalized citizenship, in short, 
America could not attract immigrants to the new world. Connected 
to this interference with the states’ control over naturalization, the 
Crown had made it more difficult for new settlers to secure “Ap-
urban phenomenon” but was one in which European artisans and laborers were set-
tling on the land in America. Id. By Bailyn’s count, over 125,000 immigrants arrived 
from the British Isles alone in the fifteen years preceding the Revolution, an average 
rate of 15,000 per year (or roughly the total estimated population of Boston in that 
day). Id. Thousands of German-speaking immigrants from the Rhine valley were also 
entering through the port of Philadelphia. Scholars estimate that some 90,000 to 
100,000 such immigrants arrived over the course of the eighteenth century. See Georg 
Fertig, Transatlantic Migration from the German-Speaking Parts of Central Europe, 
1600–1800: Proportions, Structures, and Explanations, in Europeans on the Move: 
Studies in European Migration, 1500–1800, at 192, 201–02 (Nicholas Canny ed., 1994); 
cf. David Hawke, The Colonial Experience 364 (1966) (reporting that German immi-
gration “dried up” with the outbreak of the Revolution). 
31 In suggesting a connection between naturalization rules and immigration choices, 
this Article adopts a view comparable to that explored in Adam B. Cox, Immigration 
Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 341, 361–62 (2008) (suggesting that 
rules governing the treatment of aliens after they arrive in the United States will 
shape their decisions to enter the country). Obviously the rule of naturalization was 
not the only factor that influenced immigration decisions. Immigrants were influenced 
by a range of factors, including the prospects for financial gain in the new world and 
strength of the cultural and social connections they would expect to find upon arrival. 
See Marianne Wokeck, Harnessing the Lure of the “Best Poor Man’s Country”: The 
Dynamics of German-Speaking Immigration to North America, 1683–1783, in “To 
Make America”: European Emigration in the Early Modern Period 204, 205–06 (Ida 
Altman & James Horn eds., 1991) (explaining that a full account of emigration to 
British North America must take account of both factors that pushed migrants away 
from Europe and pulled them toward the new world). Yet settlement on the land 
played an important role in the pre-industrial immigration calculus and rules of natu-
ralization were central to land ownership and to full membership in the community. 
Cf. Robert J. Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of Immigration 
Regulation, 19 Law & Hist. Rev. 645, 650–51 (2001) (suggesting that citizenship-based 
property ownership rules in the colonial period, including the alien property disabil-
ity, would operate effectively as a rejection of immigration). 
32 The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776). 
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propriations of Land.” In suggesting a linkage between naturaliza-
tion policy, land ownership, and immigration, the Declaration sim-
ply recited the conventional wisdom of the day.33
The naturalization law of the early Republic has a variety of les-
sons to teach us about the scope of congressional power over im-
migration law, not all of them welcome. To begin with, Congress 
exercised broad power to define which classes of persons were en-
titled to citizenship. In 1790, Congress limited naturalized citizen-
ship to “free white person[s],” thereby excluding aliens of color.34 If 
the Constitution broadly defined Congress’s substantive authority 
(in ways that anticipate the plenary power doctrine), it took a 
much narrower view of the manner in which Congress was to legis-
late. Thus, the naturalization clause required Congress to establish 
a nationally uniform rule and to do so through public laws of gen-
eral applicability. This was a pro-immigration stance: by ruling out 
private bills (a form of naturalization common both in England and 
in some colonies),35 the Framers required Congress to adopt public 
laws that would place the administration of naturalization law in 
the hands of the executive and judicial branches of government. 
Particularly when read against the backdrop of the restrictive and 
shadowy world of legislative naturalization practices,36 public laws 
were understood to simplify the process of naturalization, to make 
it more transparent, to make it less expensive, and, as a practical 
33 Similar links appear in the debates over naturalization in the First Congress and in 
the revealing comments of James Madison, which we discuss in Part III. 
34 An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) 
[hereinafter 1790 Act]. Such a restriction on access to citizenship reveals several 
things about the early Republic. Southern states obviously viewed slavery as central 
to the preservation of their plantation economies; subjugation of people of color was 
seen as essential to the preservation of the institution of slavery. The North’s willing-
ness to accept such restrictions reflected the same spirit of compromise that underlay 
its willingness to frame a Constitution that acknowledged and supported Southern 
slavery. Perhaps most significantly for our purposes, the provision illustrates the per-
ceived breadth of Congress’s substantive control over the definition of rights to citi-
zenship. 
35 Legislative petitions were a prominent means by which individuals sought natu-
ralization in England (and in the colonies) during the eighteenth century. See 2 Fre-
derick Clifford, A History of Private Bill Legislation 725 (Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 
1968) (1887). 
36 See infra notes 81–95 and accompanying text. 
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matter, to provide for the naturalization of more applicants for citi-
zenship.37
More generally, the requirement of an established rule of natu-
ralization was understood to foreclose retroactive changes in the 
terms on which individuals were to be admitted to citizenship. This 
Article identifies, both in the drafting of the Constitution and in its 
early congressional implementation, a strong commitment to legis-
lative prospectivity in naturalization law. The requirement of 
prospectivity reflected the perception that those who immigrated 
to the United States were entitled to rely on the rules of naturaliza-
tion that governed admission to citizenship at the time of their ar-
rival. Thus, when Congress changed the rules, it was careful to cre-
ate exceptions for aliens who already resided in the United States 
and could claim citizenship under the earlier rules.38 Even in the 
development of the restrictive and short-lived naturalization law of 
1798, a measure shaped by the urgent nationalism that arose during 
the quasi-war with France, the Federalist Congress took steps to 
moderate the law’s retroactive features.39 Jeffersonians fully re-
stored the norm of prospectivity in the naturalization act of 1802, 
where it remained until Congress’s ill-conceived decision in 1839 
(fifty years after the first naturalization act) to adopt a private bill 
in response to an individual petition.40
The constitutional law of the early Republic provides a frame-
work for evaluating the power of Congress and the role of the fed-
eral courts that can help to solve some modern immigration puz-
zles. Today’s plenary power doctrine finds a measure of support in 
the broad authority of Congress to fashion rules of naturalization. 
Congress has the power to decide who can pursue naturalized citi-
zenship, and on what terms; the power to regulate entry into the 
United States for those seeking naturalized citizenship, or some 
lesser status, would seem to follow. But those responsible for im-
37 Congress has failed to heed this admonition, with predictable consequences: arbi-
trary and inconsistent results, favoritism to the well-connected, and corruption. In the 
FBI’s 1980 ABSCAM sting operation, members of Congress were convicted of ac-
cepting bribes in exchange for agreeing to push private naturalization bills. See Ber-
nadette Maguire, Immigration: Public Legislation and Private Bills 227, 230–31 
(1997). 
38 See infra Section III.B. 
39 See infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 178 (private bill), 219–25 (1802 Act). 
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migration policy in the early Republic did not conceive of congres-
sional power as unbridled. In particular, the Framers of the Consti-
tution and the members of Congress who applied its terms in the 
early years were strongly committed to norms of prospectivity, uni-
formity, and transparency. Congress can change the rules, on this 
account, but must respect the reliance interests of those who have 
established a residence in the United States and have complied 
with the rules in place at the time of their arrival. 
These early Republic constitutional norms provide an important 
set of limits on Congress’s authority over immigration law. By rul-
ing out retrospective changes in the rules, the naturalization clause 
qualifies the plenary power doctrine and bolsters the Court’s result 
in INS v. St. Cyr.41 In addition, the naturalization clause calls into 
question the power of Congress to adopt private naturalization 
bills. This rejection of congressional case-by-case management of 
citizenship issues provides support for Justice Powell’s conclusion 
in INS v. Chadha.42 It also calls into question the continued viability 
of the public rights exception for disputes between aliens and the 
federal government over the application of immigration and natu-
ralization law. Lacking power to exercise case-by-case control over 
the grant or denial of naturalized citizenship, Congress must estab-
lish public laws of general applicability and leave the application of 
standards to executive and judicial branch officials. Congress’s in-
ability to claim discretionary control over individual cases distin-
guishes immigration law from other areas of law (the distribution 
of monetary benefits and public lands) to which the public rights 
doctrine applies.43
In exploring the elements of the early Republic’s immigration 
and naturalization Constitution, this Article proceeds in four parts. 
Part I explores the eighteenth-century origins of the naturalization 
clause, concentrating on the practical reality of immigration and 
the way naturalization rules shaped migration decisions. Part II 
41 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
42 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“When Congress finds that a 
particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this 
country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of 
powers.”). 
43 In Part IV, we distinguish the Constitution’s broad grant of congressional power 
over spending and property from its requirement that Congress establish a uniform 
rule of naturalization. 
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looks specifically at the framing of the naturalization clause and 
the way it (in turn) framed immigration policy during the early Re-
public. Not only does the text of the naturalization clause rule out 
the adoption of private naturalization bills, but also it requires 
Congress to act prospectively in making changes to the law. Part 
III explores early congressional practice. Early legislators were 
well aware of the importance of prospective lawmaking in naturali-
zation matters and consciously avoided private legislation and ret-
roactive changes in the rules governing resident aliens. 
Part IV of the Article applies the lessons of the early Republic’s 
immigration Constitution to current problems in immigration law. 
Perhaps most significantly, the requirement that Congress establish 
a uniform rule narrows the plenary power doctrine. Congress can-
not alter the rules and make them retroactively applicable to aliens 
who have lawfully established residence in the United States. Part 
IV also calls into question broad versions of the public rights doc-
trine. While Congress has power to assign discretionary decisions 
to executive branch officers, it cannot reserve that discretion to it-
self (as it attempted to do in INS v. Chadha). Nor can Congress in-
sulate immigration and naturalization decisions from the oversight 
of the federal courts. Like some expansive conceptions of plenary 
power, the public rights doctrine must yield to ensure the enforce-
ment of constitutional limits on Congress’s authority. A brief con-
clusion follows. 
I. PRELUDE: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA BEFORE 
1787 
Looking back on the growth of British North America, those 
who met in Philadelphia in 1787 to form a more perfect union did 
not envision a need for a restrictive immigration policy.44 The colo-
44 Two prominent members of the Philadelphia Convention, Alexander Hamilton 
and James Wilson, came to America from elsewhere in the British Empire. Hamilton 
arrived in 1772 from the British West Indies. Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton: 
Youth to Maturity, 1755–1788, at 34–35 (1957). Wilson arrived from Scotland in 1765. 
Charles Page Smith, James Wilson: Founding Father 20–21 (1956). As native-born 
members of the British Empire, both Hamilton and Wilson were entitled to the rights 
of Englishmen in colonial North America. Both were free, moreover, after the Decla-
ration of Independence, to choose either British or American allegiance and both 
chose America and the cause of independence. 
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nies had welcomed immigration; indeed, they competed with one 
another to recruit émigrés from the British Isles and the conti-
nent.45 Elite opinion held that immigration was a source of national 
wealth, as new arrivals broadened the productive capacity of the 
nation and expanded the domestic demand for consumer goods. 
Great Britain shared this view; indeed, it had worked hard to stem 
the tide of emigration to its North American colonies in the years 
just prior to the Revolution in the belief that the loss of population 
threatened the mother country.46 Mercantile theory called for the 
hoarding of resources, and people (especially the skilled workers 
and farmers who were leaving the great estates in droves) were 
among the resources to be hoarded.47
The growing tension between the colonies and Great Britain 
over immigration policy was nicely captured in the Declaration of 
Independence. Among its grievances was the contention that the 
King 
[H]as endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for 
that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreign-
45 Before the Constitution’s ratification, the colonies and the newly independent 
states competed with one another to attract new immigrants. See infra text accompa-
nying note 117 (quoting Pinckney’s description of differing immigration policies of the 
newer and older states). See Hawke, supra note 30, at 371–72 (reporting that Massa-
chusetts for a time required only a one-year residence for naturalization and that 
Pennsylvania required only two years). Short waiting periods in the colonies con-
trasted with the seven-year residency requirement of the 1740 Act of Parliament. Co-
lonial naturalization, however, did not necessarily confer rights good throughout the 
Empire. Id. 
46 See Daniel Statt, Foreigners and Englishmen: The Controversy over Immigration 
and Population, 1660–1760, at 49 (1995) (“[T]he more people the more trade; the 
more trade, the more money; the more money, the more strength; and the more 
strength, the greater the nation.” (quoting article by Daniel Defoe circa 1709)). 
47 For an account of the importance of national population to European thinkers, 
see Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and 
America Realized the Enlightenment 97–99 (1977) (contrasting the concern in 
Europe over shrinking populations with the perception that numbers were growing in 
America); see also Statt, supra note 46, at 49 (describing the preoccupation with 
population as the “common intellectual currency” of early modern Europe); cf. Ben-
jamin Smith Baron, Observations on the Progress of Population, and the Probabilities 
of the Duration of Human Life in the United States of America (1791), quoted in 
Commager, supra at 99 & n.21, 100 (“[N]umbers of people constitute . . . the strength 
and riches of a state; that country, whose population is rapidly advancing, may fairly 
be said to be increasing in both these concomitants of national prosperity, with pro-
portionable celerity.”).  
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ers; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, 
and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.48
Both in its general thrust and in its bill of particulars, this grievance 
tells us much about the immigration policy of the day. We hear no 
complaints that Great Britain had been foisting off unwholesome 
immigrants (convicts and paupers) on its colonies, although it in-
deed had such a policy.49 Instead, the grievance focused on meas-
ures—specifically, naturalization rules—that had impeded the 
“population of these States.” This emphasis shows that the United 
States embraced new immigrants, in large part for the wealth they 
would bring or generate on their arrival. 
To account for the American embrace of new immigration and 
to see why naturalization played a central role in immigration pol-
icy, one must understand the way the market structured immigra-
tion decisions in the pre-industrial world of the eighteenth century. 
Everyone who came to America from Europe (and Africa) arrived 
on board a sailing ship. The voyage took anywhere from six weeks 
to three months, and it cost a good deal of money.50 Most accounts 
of the price of a passenger ticket agree that the going rate ranged 
from £3–5, a figure approaching the average annual wage of many 
tenant farmers and laborers in the British Isles.51 Only those who 
48 The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776). 
49 For an account of Parliament’s decision in 1717 to encourage the transportation of 
convicts to North America through indentured servitude, see Bailyn, supra note 30, at 
292–95. Some colonies adopted measures to limit the influx of convicts. Id. at 55. In 
the years just prior to the Revolution, around 960 transported convicts were arriving 
each year. Id. at 295. 
50 Emigration from Europe to North America was available only to the relatively 
well-to-do until credit and labor markets developed the contract of indentured servi-
tude to finance the voyage. Wokeck, supra note 31, at 204–05, 217. 
51 Professor Cohn reports that most sailing ships specialized in carrying cargo, not 
passengers. Cohn, supra note 25, at 60. As a result, passenger space was in short sup-
ply and quite expensive. As late as the period from 1810–1820, a ticket from Liver-
pool to New York cost £7–12, a figure that would virtually exhaust the estimated £10–
15 annual income of an Irish farmer before the potato famine. Id. Others identify 
similar price ranges. See, e.g., Bailyn, supra note 30, at 166 (reporting a fare from 
Britain to North America in the mid-eighteenth century of £3–4 for an adult); Fertig, 
supra note 30, at 216 (reporting that fares remained relatively constant at £5–6 per 
passenger to travel from Rotterdam to Philadelphia for the period 1720–1770); see 
also Simone A. Wegge, Occupational Self-Selection of European Emigrants: Evi-
dence from Nineteenth Century Hesse-Cassel, 6 Eur. Rev. Econ. Hist. 365, 386 (2002) 
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could afford passage to the new world could become immigrants. 
Not only was the voyage itself expensive, but the time immigrants 
spent on board ship was unavailable for more productive pursuits. 
Immigrants paid both for their passage and for the food they con-
sumed on board; if they failed to pack enough supplies for the long 
voyage, they were forced to purchase food from the captain at in-
flated prices.52
The financial and temporal demands of the voyage thus pre-
vented many of the poorest, least skilled, and least desirable from 
making the trip to the new world.53 But immigration was not solely 
or primarily a pursuit of the well-to-do. (Obviously, the financially 
and socially secure had little reason to relocate.) Historians agree 
that thousands of the middling sorts—farmers, artisans, servants, 
and laborers—were among those immigrating to British North 
America.54 These immigrants paid for their passage by entering into 
contracts of indentured servitude, the terms of which varied with 
the skills of the individuals involved.55 In some instances, passen-
(concluding that it would have cost laborers in Germany anywhere from one to two 
years of wages to immigrate to North America). 
52 See Cohn, supra note 25, at 152–53. 
53 Thus, only the wealthy could immigrate to the new world before the indenture 
and labor credit markets developed. See Wokeck, supra note 31, at 204–05. Even 
later, when indentured service made the passage affordable to a broader range of 
immigrants, scholars have shown that German immigrants had higher rates of literacy 
than the folks back home. See Fertig, supra note 30, at 232 (contrasting a literacy rate 
of seventy-one percent among German immigrants with a literacy rate in Germany of 
only fifty-five percent). In keeping with such findings, others have shown that a dis-
proportionate share of German immigrants were skilled artisans rather than unskilled 
laborers. See Wegge, supra note 51, at 378, 382–83 (suggesting that the cost of immi-
gration kept laborers from immigrating in numbers proportional to their representa-
tion in the labor market). 
54 Bailyn, supra note 30, at 26 (describing the mix of workers coming from the Brit-
ish Isles just prior to the Revolution). 
55 Scholars agree on the significance of the contract of indenture in expanding the 
flow of immigrants. See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 243 (reporting that half of the immi-
grants from the British Isles settled in North America as indentured servants); Fertig, 
supra note 30, at 216 (identifying the development of an indentured servant market as 
crucial to the expansion of immigration); Wokeck, supra note 31, at 217 (noting the 
role of indentured servitude in facilitating German immigration to North America). 
See generally David W. Galenson, White Servitude in Colonial America: An Eco-
nomic Analysis (1981). Galenson reports that the length of the period of indentured 
service and the amount of “freedom dues” varied with the skill level of the individual. 
Id. at 102–03. Contracts for indentured servitude were bought and sold, often while 
the servant was still on board the ship in the harbor. Id. at 97. 
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gers contracted directly with the captain of the vessel; these con-
tracts were sold when the voyage ended in America. On other oc-
casions, labor entrepreneurs would recruit particular workers, en-
tering into indentures and paying the passage themselves. Either 
way, the arrangements depended on the existence of relatively 
well-established labor markets in America, where captains or re-
cruiters could reliably dispose of the contracts of indentured ser-
vants. Historians estimate that indentured servitude, although es-
sentially defunct by the early nineteenth century,56 accounted for 
something approaching half of all immigration to America in the 
eighteenth century.57
Judging from the sentiments expressed in the Declaration of In-
dependence, the arrival in America of thousands of relatively im-
pecunious indentured servants did not pose a social problem. In 
many cases, the market for indentured servitude would operate to 
prevent new immigrants from becoming a public charge. Inden-
tures required the master to provide the servant with food and 
lodging throughout the term of the contract. After the period of 
servitude ended, moreover, the contract typically called for the 
master to provide the servant with a cash stipend with which to 
start a new life.58 In a growing economy, with expanding labor mar-
kets and cheap land available on the frontier, Americans viewed 
themselves as having little to fear and much to gain from the arri-
val of masses of indentured servants. 
In addition to indentured servants, another stream of immigrants 
headed more or less directly to the land, either buying property 
outright or taking up a grant under a land scheme promoted by 
speculators. Bernard Bailyn speaks of “an extraordinary flood of 
immigration” to America in the 1760s and 1770s, and of a closely 
56 On the demise of indentures to finance passage to North America, see Wegge, su-
pra note 31, at 371 (reporting that use of indentures had all but ended by 1830). 
57 See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 166, 243 (reporting that indentured servants and re-
demptioners accounted for approximately forty-eight percent of all immigrants from 
the British Isles in the years immediately preceding the Revolution). 
58 The freedom dues, as they were known, varied in accordance with the skills of the 
servant. Early practice in colonial Virginia was to provide the indentured servant with 
fifty acres of land upon conclusion of the period of servitude. See Galenson, supra 
note 55, at 11. Galenson reports that colonial law often fixed the amount of freedom 
dues, id. at 253 n.17, but skilled laborers could bargain for shorter terms of indenture 
and “encouragements of another nature.” Id. at 207 (quoting 1 Lewis Cecil Gray, His-
tory of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, at 364–65 (1958)). 
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associated “sudden and immense spread of settlement in the back-
country of the coastal colonies and in the trans-Appalachian 
west.”59 His account of how this immigration occurred identifies a 
range of players, including the large (absentee) landowners in Brit-
ish North America (Lord Fairfax in Virginia; the Earl of Granville 
in North Carolina); the enterprising middlemen and speculators; 
the merchants and captains who arranged the passage of would-be 
landowners; and the local notables in England, Scotland, and Ire-
land, who put together groups of emigrating farmers.60 Package 
deals (through which emigrants would obtain title to land and pas-
sage across the sea) attracted relatively well-established farmers 
and their families, who sought to escape from rising rents and en-
closures to an independent life in the new world.61
While direct immigration to farming settlements in North Amer-
ica was possible for subjects of the Crown living anywhere in the 
British Isles, foreigners could not quite so confidently settle di-
rectly on the land. At common law throughout the British Empire, 
aliens could not hold title to real property.62 For the sizable stream 
of Swiss-, French-, and German-speaking immigrants, many of 
whom entered North America through the port at Philadelphia, 
land ownership was not possible until they secured naturalized citi-
zenship or some form of denization (a status conferred by the 
Crown that empowered aliens to hold a life estate in real prop-
erty). Like their British counterparts, these continental Europeans 
often paid for their passage to North America by signing contracts 
of indenture. Such contracts would necessarily require immigrants 
to spend some time in servitude, establishing residency and learn-
ing the ways of America. Many speculative land settlement 
schemes, moreover, included provisions whereby colonial gover-
59 Bailyn, supra note 30, at 3. 
60 On large landholders, see id. at 356. As for enterprising middlemen, Bailyn de-
scribes the efforts of John Witherspoon, President of what became Princeton Univer-
sity, to recruit immigrants from Scotland. Id. at 390–92. As for local notables, Bailyn 
tells the story of James Hogg, an energetic Scotsman who immigrated to North Caro-
lina along with his family and a large group of neighbors. Id. at 506–07. 
61 Bailyn reports that many provincial emigrants left the north of England, Scotland, 
and Ireland and headed directly to the land. Id. at 203. These rural emigrants tended 
to be older, more likely to travel as part of a family, and more likely to pay their own 
way. Id. Emigrants from London, by contrast, tended to be young, male, and single, 
and financed the trip by agreeing to indentured servitude. Id. at 202. 
62 See infra notes 73–80 and 96–99 and accompanying text. 
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nors would provide new arrivals both a land grant and a form of 
denization status.63
The Crown sought to contain the migration of the population to 
the frontier. Not only was the rage for speculation and land owner-
ship de-populating the tenant farms in Ireland, northern England, 
and Scotland,64 but much of the new settlement was taking place 
beyond the Proclamation Line of 1763 in the trans-Appalachian 
region that the Crown had promised to reserve for Native Ameri-
cans.65 To stem the tide, the Crown hit upon three policies, all of 
which found their way into the Declaration’s population grievance. 
First, the Crown took steps to countermand colonial programs that 
were designed to attract new settlers from the British Isles. In 1731, 
South Carolina established a program of bounties and benefits to 
attract emigrants from Ireland. Other colonies had followed suit.66 
But in 1767, citing the need to control British emigration, the 
Crown vetoed a Georgia bill that sought to attract new immigrants. 
A North Carolina act of 1771 met the same fate.67 These vetoes ex-
emplified the Declaration’s charge that the Crown had refused to 
adopt laws “to encourage . . . migrations hither.”68
Second, the Crown sought to end the issuance of large, specula-
tive land grants. In April 1773, the Privy Council prohibited Crown 
governors from granting any more land in America pending the 
development of a comprehensive policy.69 Behind this temporary 
stay was the perception that emigration from Britain had been too 
greatly encouraged by the delusional schemes of unscrupulous land 
63 See James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship 1608–1870, at 
89–96 (1978); see also supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
64 The alarm in England over the loss of tenant farmers and artisans had become 
quite general by the 1760s. Tours of the countryside produced gloomy reports of 
wholesale emigration, and leading politicians called for measures to restrict emigra-
tion. See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55–56. 
65 For an account, see D.W. Meinig, 1 The Shaping of America: A Geographical 
Perspective on 500 Years of History: Atlantic America, 1492–1800, at 284–88 (1986) 
(explaining that the Proclamation Line of 1763, defined as the top of the Appalachian 
Mountains, reserved the interior to Native Americans). Yet with the end of the 
French and Indian War, and the absence of French opposition in the interior, British 
settlers quickly pushed beyond this boundary. See id. at 287–88, 296. 
66 See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55; Kettner, supra note 63, at 113. 
67 See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55. 
68 The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776). 
69 See Bailyn, supra note 30, at 55–56. 
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jobbers. Later, in February 1774, the Crown announced its new 
policy. Instead of land grants in bulk, all public lands were to be 
surveyed and sold in small lots (100 to 1000 acres) at well-
publicized public auctions.70 This policy was expected both to en-
sure actual settlement on the land (thus guaranteeing that the 
Crown would receive its quit rents) and to combat profiteering and 
cronyism on the part of colonial governors and their circle.71 From 
the colonists’ perspective, as expressed in the Declaration, the new 
Crown policy effectively “rais[ed] the conditions of new Appro-
priations of Lands” and made emigration less attractive.72
The third and final element of the population grievance focused 
on colonial naturalization policy. Under the rules of common law, 
birthright citizenship extended to all subjects born in the realm un-
der allegiance to the monarch.73 On this view, those born in the 
British colonies of North America enjoyed birthright citizenship 
and were subjects of the Crown.74 By contrast, those born within, 
and owing allegiance to, other nations were aliens,75 and suffered 
from a variety of disabilities, including the inability to own land in 
England and the British dominions.76 The Crown could obviate 
these disabilities of alienage to a limited degree by granting deniza-
70 Id. at 56. 
71 Id. 
72 The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776). 
73 Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 406 (K.B.) (“Every one that is an alien by 
birth, may be, or might have been, an enemy by accident: but Calvin could never at 
any time be an enemy by any accident; Ergo, he cannot be an alien by birth.”); 1 
Blackstone, supra note 25, at *356–57. For an in-depth analysis of Calvin’s Case, see 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Ed-
ward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 Law & Hist. Rev. 439, 454–58 (2003); Polly J. 
Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 73 (1997). See generally Kettner, supra note 63, at 29. 
74 See 1 Sir John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England 410–12 (London, 
Strahan, Samuel Rose ed., 4th ed. 1800). An important statute, adopted in 1700, con-
ferred birth-right citizenship on the children of aliens born in the colonies. See A.H. 
Carpenter, Naturalization in England and the American Colonies, 9 Am. Hist. Rev. 
288, 292 (1904). 
75 1 Blackstone, supra note 25, at *354; see also 1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 409 
(“An alien is one who is born out of the ligeance of the king.”). 
76 Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399; 1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 413, 415; see also 1 
Clifford, supra note 35, at 382 (“One of the chief reasons for naturalization was that 
aliens could not hold real estate.”). For additional information on land rights of natu-
ralized subjects and denizens, see 1 William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Con-
stitution in the History of the United States 438 (1953). 
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tion;77 a denizen could acquire a life estate in real property but 
could not always pass title to his heirs.78 In addition, Parliament 
could confer full citizenship through the passage of legislation 
naturalizing the alien.79 For much of seventeenth century, private 
acts of Parliament offered the principal means by which aliens 
sought naturalization.80
The private bill process had a number of serious problems, espe-
cially for those of modest means who were hoping to acquire land 
in the new world.81 Private bills were quite expensive to obtain.82 
Parliament, like virtually all government bodies of the day, oper-
ated on a fee-based payment system.83 Fees were payable at various 
77 1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 418 (“The king only has the prerogative to make any 
alien to be a denizen. And cannot grant this prerogative to any other. The usual man-
ner of a denization is by letters patent.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Kettner, 
supra note 63, at 30 (“Denization came to be seen as ‘a high and incommunicable 
branch of the royal prerogative,’ a grant of the king’s grace by which some, but not all, 
privileges of natural-born subjects were conferred.”). For a short period in the late 
seventeenth century, the Crown established a liberal denization policy that led to a 
sharp spike in the number of such grants conferred. See Statt, supra note 46, at 35. 
78 1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 418 (stating that title could be passed to “issue” born 
after denization, but not before); Kettner, supra note 63, at 29–30 (“Until about the 
fifteenth century no such distinction between naturalization and denization had ex-
isted. Rather the king and Parliament worked together in bringing outsiders into the 
community of subjects. A foreigner who wished to acquire the status and privileges of 
an Englishman would petition Parliament, which would then authorize him to obtain 
a grant of royal letters patent under the great seal.”); see also id. at 31 (“The formal 
grant of letters patent of denization removed some of the disabilities of alienage re-
stricting property rights.”). 
79 1 Comyns, supra note 74, at 411 (“Naturalization can only be by parliament.”); see 
also Kettner, supra note 63, at 29, 33–34. In East India Company v. Sandys, counsel 
observed in argument that rights and freedom of citizens “ought not to be granted to 
aliens, not by the king under his great seal, without the consent of the Lords and 
Commons, the representatives of the subjects in parliament.” Id. at 32 (quoting East 
India Co. v. Sandys, (1863–1865) 10 S.T. 371, 499). 
80 1 Clifford, supra note 35, at 378–83. 
81 See Kettner, supra note 63, at 67–69; see also Crosskey, supra note 76, at 488 (as-
serting that the Framers inserted the uniformity clause in the Constitution in order to 
thwart state use of private acts of naturalization which made naturalization “the result 
of favoritism and political influence, if not of anything worse”). 
82 See Statt, supra note 46, at 34 (describing private bills in Parliament as “slow, ex-
pensive, and risky” and citing a House of Commons report that reckoned the cost of a 
bill of naturalization at £63, a price “outside the reach of all but the richest of immi-
grants”). 
83 2 Clifford, supra note 35, at 717 (quoting the letters patent that conferred the of-
fice of under clerk as requiring the payment of £10, lawful money of Great Britain, 
payable half-yearly at the Exchequer, “together with all other rewards, dues, rights, 
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stages along the way: upon introduction of the bill, on its official 
entry in the rolls, on issuance of a favorable committee report, on 
ultimate adoption, and so forth.84 Fees were even charged to have 
the bill carried from the House of Commons to the House of 
Lords.85 The Speaker of the House and the Chancellor (who served 
as the speaker of the House of Lords) both earned enormous in-
comes from the collection of these fees.86 Lesser figures, including 
clerks, scriveners, and tipstaffs also received a portion of such 
fees.87 The cost of private legislation made it a practical solution 
only for individuals of fairly substantial means. 
Parliament experimented with a more affordable (and hence 
democratic) mode of naturalization.88 In 1709, Parliament adopted 
an “Act for naturalizing Foreign Protestants,” and thus created a 
relatively cheap and streamlined, if religiously exclusive, mecha-
nism for conferring naturalization.89 The Act required that the indi-
vidual seeking naturalization make an oath of allegiance to the 
Crown of England, disavow the Catholic doctrine of transubstan-
tiation, and offer proof of recent (Protestant) religious obser-
vance.90 The proceeding was conducted in open court, and cost only 
one shilling.91 Afterward, applicants were regarded as natural-born 
subjects and their names were entered in the court’s records.92 Tory 
opposition to this more streamlined mode of naturalization quickly 
profits, commodities, advantages and endowments whatsoever to the said office, after 
what manner soever, or however, now or heretofore, anciently appertaining, incident, 
accustomed, incumbent, or belonging”); id. at 716–17 (noting the requirement that 
those seeking a private bill pay fees to both clerks and high officials and describing 
the system as “continually abused by excessive charges”). 
84 Id. at 716–18. 
85 Id. at 719–20. 
86 Id. at 725 (noting that officials in both Houses “had always derived considerable 
fees” from naturalization bills). 
87 Id. at 717–18. 
88 Id. at 725. 
89 An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1708, 7 Ann., c. 5, § 3 (Eng.). For an 
account, see Statt, supra note 46, at 35–37 (compiling figures that reveal a significant 
increase in the number of naturalizations under the Act of 1709 and attributing the 
low number of naturalizations in other periods to the “difficulty and expense in-
volved”). 
90 An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1708, 7 Ann., c. 5, § 2 (Eng.); see 
also Kettner, supra note 63, at 70. 
91 Kettner, supra note 63, at 70. 
92 Id. 
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emerged. The Act would, according to its opponents, encourage 
immigrants to vote, hold office, intermarry, and eventually, “extin-
guish the English race.”93 Tories favored a return to the private bill 
process so the Parliament could limit naturalization to those aliens 
of “individual merit.”94 Such a shift would necessarily limit natu-
ralization to the well-to-do and restore the fee revenue associated 
with private legislation. Sure enough, in 1712, when the Tories re-
captured Parliament, they repealed the public act and returned to 
the costly and restrictive private bill system.95
The return to private legislation posed a problem for the colo-
nies of British North America. Before acquiring land in the new 
world, aliens of the “middling sort” were in theory required to ob-
tain either denization or naturalization, a status they could ill af-
ford to pursue in London.96 Understandably, then, land speculators 
approached the colonial governors and assemblies to secure the 
sort of denizen or citizen status they needed to attract immigrants. 
Governors granted denization for a time, and colonies developed 
their own naturalization policies, subject to a degree of oversight 
by the Crown and Privy Council, as part of a predictable form of 
competition for new settlers.97 Growth and settlement naturally in-
creased the wealth of the colonies and, not incidentally, lined the 
pockets of colonial governors, who received fee payments them-
selves for denizations and from settlers who took up new land 
93 Id. at 70–71. 
94 Id. at 71. 
95 Id. at 72. 
96 Cora Start, Naturalization in the English Colonies in America, in Annual Report 
of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893, at 319–20 (1894); see also 
Kettner, supra note 63, at 66–67. 
97 Kettner, supra note 63, at 76. As Kettner explains: 
By the end of the seventeenth century the colonial governments, acting on du-
bious legal authority, had already established a variety of procedures for incor-
porating aliens into the local communities. In contrast to the restrictive policies 
favored in London, the acts passed by colonial legislators granted aliens exten-
sive rights and benefits. The American governments gave little attention to 
theoretical limitations on naturalization and denization—indeed, their actions 
often displayed either an extensive ignorance of or a blatant disregard for those 
limitations. Survival, population growth, and economic expansion—not doc-
trinal consistency—dictated the course of colonial policy. 
Id. at 78. 
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grants.98 With competition for settlers came some slackening of 
standards; some colonies refused to recognize other colonial grants 
of citizenship and denization, and the Privy Council overrode cer-
tain colonial naturalization procedures.99
Parliament responded to the demand for a system of naturaliza-
tion with the passage of a second public act in 1740.100 Designed to 
provide a public mechanism for naturalization, the Act of 1740 im-
posed a uniform rule throughout the British Empire.101 Applicants 
were required to reside for at least seven years in their colony, 
prove that they were religiously observant Protestants, and have 
their names entered in local court records.102 The Act prescribed a 
uniform fee for naturalization, which was no more than two shil-
lings, and further provided for the issuance of certificates of natu-
ralization that entitled the new British subjects to the “rights of 
Englishmen” throughout the realm.103 In 1773, at the same time the 
Crown was tightening the rules for the transfer of public lands and 
vetoing laws to encourage emigration from Britain, Parliament 
clarified that the Act of 1740 was meant to be exclusive. By declar-
ing the exclusivity of the 1740 Act, Parliament effectively banned 
naturalization under the more lenient colonial naturalization laws 
and practices.104 It was the Act of 1773 that gave rise to the natu-
ralization grievance in the Declaration of Independence, which de-
scribed the Crown as having obstructed “the Laws for Naturaliza-
tion of Foreigners.”105
98 Id. at 83, 119–21 (observing that Pennsylvania colonial proprietors successfully 
opposed legislation that would have deprived them of the fee revenue associated with 
re-grants of land to survivors of aliens whose land escheated to the Crown upon their 
death). 
99 Id. at 119; see also Start, supra note 96, at 320 (describing “two species [of natu-
ralization] in the colonies—naturalization as prescribed by English law and naturali-
zation by the colonists, by methods of their own adoption”). 
100 An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein Men-
tioned, as Are Settled, or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in America, 
1740, 13 Geo. II, c. 7 (Eng.); see also Kettner, supra note 63, at 74. 
101 Kettner, supra note 63, at 74. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 75. 
104 An Act Amending the Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1773, 13 Geo. 
III, c. 21 (Eng.). 
105 The Declaration of Independence para. 9 (U.S. 1776); see Kettner, supra note 63, 
at 105. 
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Following the conclusion of hostilities and the negotiation of the 
1783 Treaty of Peace, naturalization policy fell to the states and 
they responded with a profusion of approaches meant to attract 
new immigrants from Europe.106 Thus, the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion allowed any foreigner “of good character” who was willing to 
swear an oath of allegiance to purchase land in the Common-
wealth. After one year, the newly arrived Pennsylvanian became a 
free denizen, with most of the rights of a natural-born citizen, and a 
full citizen one year later.107 Similarly liberal provisions appeared in 
the constitutions of Vermont and North Carolina.108 Many states—
including Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia—
defined the rights of naturalization by statute, with more and less 
liberal provisions.109 The southern states tended to require longer 
residency periods, invariably limited the right of naturalization to 
“free white persons,” and sometimes imposed limits on admission 
to full rights of citizenship.110 In South Carolina, for example, full 
citizenship required the adoption of a private bill.111 New England 
states, which had refrained from encouraging immigration from 
European countries other than England, similarly relied on private 
legislation and failed to adopt any general or public law of natu-
ralization.112
Interstate mobility inevitably put pressure on the states’ ability 
to maintain restrictive views of citizenship.113 After the Articles of 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 215. 
110 Kettner, supra note 63, at 215–16. Virginia passed an act in 1779 admitting all 
“white persons born within the territory and all who had resided there for the two 
years preceding” as citizens of the state. Id. at 215. Aliens could attain citizen status 
by public oath or affirmation. Id. 
111 Id. at 215–16. 
112 See Start, supra note 96, at 325 (“The colonists in attempting naturalization drew 
from their English models. Denization was the first form adopted in the colonies, the 
letters patent being issued by the governor, under the mistaken opinion that such 
power was his as the King’s deputy. It is found in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
and continued until its prohibition at the end of the seventeenth century. The cost of 
denization was greater than other forms of naturalization. Lord Bellemont com-
plained in 1699 that he could obtain but 12 shillings for his denizations, while his 
predecessor in New York, Governor Fletcher, received £10 for himself and £5 for the 
attorney general. Fees for naturalization in general ranged from 2 to 50 shillings.”). 
113 See Kettner, supra note 63, at 110. 
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Confederation were ratified in 1781, the “free inhabitants” of every 
state (aside from paupers and vagabonds) were entitled to move 
freely throughout the United States and to enjoy the “privileges 
and immunities” of free citizens in the several states.114 No less a 
figure than James Madison found the confusion of language in this 
provision remarkable. It effectively permitted an alien to seek 
naturalization in a state with permissive naturalization practices 
and then move to a state with tighter restrictions, and still be enti-
tled to all the incumbent rights of naturalized citizens in the second 
state.115 But whatever privileges newly admitted citizens and deni-
zens might claim under this provision, which included civil rights 
but perhaps not full political rights, there was little doubt that for-
eigners might tend to choose the state with the most liberal admis-
114 The Articles of Confederation provided that: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among 
the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of 
these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; 
and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any 
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, 
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants 
thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to 
prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State of 
which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or re-
striction, shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or ei-
ther of them.  
Articles of Confederation art. IV. There was no provision in the Articles dealing with 
naturalization, thus leaving regulation of the matter to the states. 
115 The Federalist No. 42, at 285–86 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“[T]hose who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of a State, although 
not citizens of such State, are entitled in every other State to all the privileges of free 
citizens of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their 
own State; so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is 
laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon 
any whom it may admit to such rights within itself; but upon any whom it may allow 
to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. . . . The very improper power would still 
be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State 
residence for a short term confers all the rights of citizenship. In another qualifica-
tions of greater importance are required. An alien therefore legally incapacitated for 
certain rights in the latter, may by previous residence only in the former, elude his in-
capacity; and thus the law of one State, be preposterously rendered paramount to the 
law of another, within the jurisdiction of the other.”). 
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sion policy and then move to another state after establishing a form 
of legal status.116
The combined effect of competition among states and interstate 
mobility created a sort of de facto national citizenship that laid the 
foundation for a national constitutional standard. As early as 1782, 
James Madison argued for the creation of a uniform rule of natu-
ralization. Charles Pinckney (from the restrictive state of South 
Carolina) made a similar argument at the Philadelphia Convention, 
noting that “[t]he younger States will hold out every temptation to 
foreigners, by making the admission to office less difficult in their 
Governments, than the older,” and that “a foreigner, as soon as he 
is admitted to the rights of citizenship in one, becomes entitled to 
them in all.”117 Because “in some States, the residence which will 
enable a foreigner to hold any office, will not in others intitle him 
to a vote,” the only way to “render this power generally useful [is 
to place it] in the Union, where alone it can be equally exercised.”118 
Widespread acceptance of the argument for a national standard 
made the transfer of naturalization power to the new federal gov-
ernment one of the least controversial features of the new Consti-
tution.119
II. FRAMING THE CONSTITUTION’S NATURALIZATION CLAUSE 
Perhaps as a result of the lack of controversy over the proper lo-
cus of naturalization authority, the debates at the Philadelphia 
Convention provide little direct insight into the meaning of the 
naturalization clause. The provision did not appear in the Virginia 
Plan, and so did not occasion any debate in the early days of the 
Convention, when the delegates acted through the Committee of 
116 See Kettner, supra note 63, at 116–17 (recounting successful efforts of two pro-
spective citizens to sidestep restrictive practices of Rhode Island by securing citizen-
ship in New York and Massachusetts). 
117 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 120 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter Farrand]. 
118 Id. (emphasis added). 
119 The principle of free movement of people has similarly produced pressure to 
harmonize national asylum and immigration laws in the European Union. See Lauren 
Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration Policy in the U.S. and the European Un-
ion, 14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 99, 119–26 (2007) (describing the push toward harmonization 
in light of disparate approaches to immigration in Great Britain, France, and Ger-
many). 
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the Whole. Later, with the introduction of the New Jersey Plan on 
June 15, 1787, naturalization made its first appearance in the for-
mal record of the Convention in the form of a declaration that the 
“rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State.”120 The 
Convention did not take any special notice of the provision at that 
time but simply submitted it to the Committee of Detail in late July 
along with the amended terms of the Virginia Plan. On August 6, 
the naturalization clause as reported by the Committee of Detail 
was approved by the delegates without controversy or recorded 
debate.121 Moreover, it was included in the final text of the Consti-
tution in virtually the same terms that the Committee of Detail had 
proposed, with only minor adjustments by the Committee of 
Style.122
If the debates and drafting history tell us little, we can nonethe-
less learn much from the text itself and from the assumptions that 
influenced the drafting process. By empowering Congress to estab-
lish a uniform rule for naturalization throughout the United States, 
the naturalization clause first carries an implication of relative 
permanence: the uniform rule contemplated in the Constitution 
was to be “establish[ed]” by Congress.123 To “establish” a single 
uniform rule of naturalization was to put in place a relatively per-
manent system. Such an established system would not be fixed in 
perpetuity, of course; Congress could alter the rules over time with 
changes in circumstances. But an established system was one that 
immigrants could depend upon in making the decision to come to 
the United States. We propose to give content to this notion of 
relative stability by viewing the “establish” requirement as creating 
a norm of prospectivity: once established, the rule of naturalization 
was to control until changed through prospective legislation. 
120 1 Farrand, supra note 117, at 242, 245. 
121 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 182. 
122 When the Committee of Style presented its report on September 12, 1787, the 
naturalization and bankruptcy clauses were finally joined, granting Congress the 
power “[t]o establish an uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on the sub-
ject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Id. at 595; cf. id. at 569 (draft in 
Committee of Detail). 
123 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The use of the word “establish” marked an important 
change from a previous draft, which sought to grant Congress the power to “regulate” 
naturalization. See infra note 128. 
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Along with this norm of relative permanence, Congress was au-
thorized to establish a single “uniform rule” throughout the United 
States.124 This demanding requirement of uniformity was meant to 
displace the state-to-state variability that had characterized life un-
der the Articles of Confederation.125 Under a uniform system, im-
124 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Supreme Court has never engaged in an extensive 
interpretation of the uniformity clause in the immigration context. See Iris Bennett, 
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggra-
vated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1697–98 (1999). Early cases as-
sumed that uniformity had similar meanings in both bankruptcy and naturalization, 
and that such uniformity required only uniform application. Judith Schenck Koffler, 
The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of 
Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 22, 35–40 (1983). More recently, and in 
response to scholars’ prodding, the Supreme Court has suggested that the naturaliza-
tion clause demands a strict form of uniformity and leaves little room for state modifi-
cation. See Bennett, supra, at 1705–20; cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 
(1971) (dictum) (“Congress’ power is to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.’ 
A congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt diver-
gent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally supported welfare 
programs would appear to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement of uni-
formity.”). Such arguments have arisen in relation to state regulation of welfare bene-
fits for non-citizens and in relation to the definition of deportable offenses. Gilbert 
Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy 
of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 591, 633–36 (1994) (arguing that Congress can-
not incorporate state law into application of the naturalization power); Michael T. 
Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 Geo. L.J. 1007, 1017–18 (1976). Two 
lower court decisions dealing with uniformity in naturalization concluded that geo-
graphic uniformity was the Framers’ aim. See Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United States, 
125 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1942) (holding that uniformity relates to geographic uni-
formity and not racial uniformity); Petition of Lee Wee, 143 F. Supp. 736, 738 (S.D. 
Cal. 1956) (finding constitutional a statute which made a gambling offense proof 
against good moral character for immigration purposes, even though the underlying 
offense would not have been gambling in another city). 
125 What little debate surrounded the naturalization clause tended to focus on the 
need for an end to state-to-state disparity in naturalization procedures. James Madi-
son, in an unpublished draft written toward the end of his life, recalled the “defects, 
the deformities, the diseases and the ominous prospects, for which the Convention 
were [sic] to provide a remedy.” 3 Farrand, supra note 117, at 549. One such “defect[] 
which had been severely felt” was “that of a uniformity in cases requiring it, as laws of 
naturalization, bankruptcy, a Coercive authority opperating [sic] on individuals and a 
guaranty of the internal tranquility of the States.” Id. at 548. Madison issued a similar 
call for uniformity in a letter written to Edmund Randolph in 1782: “the intrusion of 
obnoxious aliens through other States, merit[s] attention. [This] subject has, on sev-
eral occasions, been mentioned in Congress, but, I believe, no committee has ever re-
ported a remedy for the abuse. A uniform rule of naturalization ought certainly to be 
recommended to the States.” Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph 
(Aug. 27, 1782), in 1 The Writings of James Madison 226–27 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1900), cited in Hertz, supra note 124, at 1009. 
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migrants would confront the same requirements for citizenship no 
matter where they settled in the United States. Such uniformity 
would limit state competition for new immigrants and would pre-
vent immigrants from seeking citizenship under one state’s regime 
and then transferring their newly acquired citizenship to another 
state under the privileges and immunities clause. More subtly, the 
rule of uniformity would necessarily extend beyond formal citizen-
ship to reach those awaiting naturalization as denizens (or what we 
would today call “lawful permanent residents”). 
Two important structural implications follow from the demand 
for a uniform rule of naturalization and denization. First, from a 
federalism perspective, the demand for a uniform rule eliminates 
the states’ role in prescribing the rules that govern naturalization. 
Uniformity can be achieved only through the specification of rules 
at the national level, although the system may tolerate some incor-
poration of state law by reference. Second, the requirement of an 
established and uniform rule imposes important limitations on the 
manner in which Congress regulates naturalization. Uniformity 
rules out the use of private bills, which were understood to admit 
aliens to citizenship on a case-by-case basis. Such private legisla-
tion not only produced unacceptable variation in the terms of natu-
ralization but also made naturalization more expensive, more elit-
ist, and more prone to corruption. 
A variety of evidence supports this understanding of the re-
quirement that Congress establish a uniform rule for naturaliza-
tion. As for the claim that the word “establish” conveys a distinc-
tive message of relative permanence and prospectivity, the 
Constitution itself supplies confirmation. The Constitution uses the 
word “establish” rather sparingly, and in contexts that suggest not 
absolute inflexibility but relative permanence. The preamble pro-
poses to “ordain and establish” the Constitution, and thus to put in 
place a government structure based on higher law that was immune 
from change except through the process of amendment. One goal 
of the preamble, “to establish Justice,” also conveys a message of 
relative permanence; it connects to Congress’s power in Article III 
to “ordain and establish” a system of lower federal courts that have 
been a permanent part of the government since their “estab-
lish[ment]” in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Like these grants of 
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power, Congress’s power to establish a system of naturalization 
suggests a degree of permanence.126
The papers of the Committee of Detail confirm the significance 
of the Framers’ decision to require Congress to establish a uniform 
rule. An early draft places the naturalization power in Article I, 
empowering Congress “to regulate naturalization.”127 A later draft 
returns to the language of the New Jersey Plan, specifying that “the 
Rule for Naturalization ought to be the same in every State.”128 A 
final draft returns the clause to its eventual place in Article I, em-
powering Congress “to establish an uniform Rule for Naturalization 
throughout the United States.”129 We can thus see the clause evolv-
ing in Committee from an initial grant of relatively unbridled 
power to Congress, to a provision focused on inter-state comity, 
and finally to a provision that ultimately both empowers and con-
strains Congress. The drafting history nicely contrasts the early 
grant of plenary power to regulate naturalization and the more 
constrained power conferred in the final text. 
Debates over qualifications for election to the House and Senate 
provide important insights into the Framers’ view of prospectivity 
126 The Framers’ choice of the term “establish” to define and limit congressional 
power was not inadvertent, but reflected a rejection of an early draft that would have 
empowered Congress more broadly to “regulate” naturalization. See infra note 129 
and accompanying text. Other power grants in Article I have been framed to confer 
broad power on Congress. Congress’s seemingly unbridled power to “lay and collect 
taxes” has been regarded as quite broad, empowering Congress to impose taxes on 
transactions and events that have already occurred. Similarly, Congress’s power to 
“make rules” for the government of the military, to “regulate” commerce, and to 
“make all laws” under the necessary and proper clause convey broad power. 
127 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 144 (Committee of Detail, IV). See generally Tho-
mas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce 
Power, 91 Va. L. Rev. 249, 263–84 (2005). In his article, Professor Colby argues that 
“uniform” encompasses both “uniform rules” and “uniform treatment.” Uniform 
rules “signify a single set of regulations that are generally applicable nationwide, in 
service of the goal of economic efficiency” or, more or less, “uniform laws.” Id. at 263. 
In contrast, uniform treatment implies a system that is applied equally and fairly. Id. 
at 264. 
128 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 158 (Committee of Detail, VII); see id. at 157 n.15 
(noting that this draft’s language was likely taken from the New Jersey Plan). 
129 Id. at 167 (Committee of Detail, IX); see id. at 163 n.17 (language “to establish an 
uniform Rule for Naturalization throughout the United States” was an addition by 
Wilson). Wilson’s role in crafting the language that limited Congress’s authority bears 
notice, both in light of his Scottish origins and in light of the views he expressed on 
the need for prospectivity in the debate over qualifications for national office. See in-
fra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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as an essential element in the establishment of a system of naturali-
zation.130 The issue arose in connection with the consideration of a 
proposal to require citizenship for a minimum of seven years as a 
condition of election to the House of Representatives.131 The pro-
posal would disqualify newly-naturalized citizens, including those 
who had not been subject to any such disability at the time of their 
admission to citizenship.132 The disqualification was relatively mild; 
naturalized citizens would qualify as soon as the seven-year period 
had passed.133 Still, delegates to the Convention reminded one an-
other that the nation had invited new immigrants to join the com-
munity with an unqualified promise of citizenship; to impose a 
qualification now that would degrade them to the status of second-
class citizens (if only for a specified period of time) would breach 
the public faith, and would impose an improperly retroactive 
change in the naturalization system.134 Roger Sherman, a delegate 
from Connecticut, rejected this breach of faith claim; he argued 
that the United States might establish rules for the future that dif-
fered from the rules (and promises) that the states had made in the 
past.135 Sherman did not deny that a retrospective change in the 
rules was problematic; instead, he argued that as a new polity the 
130 Those debates began with a motion by Gouverneur Morris to require senators to 
have been citizens for at least fourteen years, a period long enough to have disquali-
fied all foreigners naturalized since the Declaration of Independence. Id. at 235. 
Madison, Franklin, Wilson, and others decried Morris’s approach as injecting “illiber-
ality” into the Constitution. Id. at 235–37. 
 Interestingly, Britain had acted in 1773 to extend full political rights to those natu-
ralized under the Act of 1740. These rights included the right to take any “Office or 
Place of Trust, either Civil or Military” and to take “any Grant of Lands, Tenements, 
and Hereditaments.” Kettner, supra note 63, at 77. 
131 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 268. 
132 Morris started the debate over retroactivity by proposing a proviso that would 
have made it clear that the disqualification of recently naturalized citizens would not 
apply to anyone who had been naturalized when the Constitution took effect. Id. at 
270. According to another Convention attendee, “[i]t was necessary . . . to prevent a 
disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under the faith (& according 
to)—the laws & Constitution (from) being on a level in all respects with natives.” Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 270–71. 
135 Id. at 270 (“The U. States have not invited foreigners nor pledged their faith that 
they should enjoy equal privileges with native Citizens. The Individual States alone 
have done this. The former therefore are at liberty to make any discriminations they 
may judge requisite.”). 
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United States was not necessarily bound by the promises of its con-
stituent members.136
Sherman’s contention triggered a defense of the principle of pro-
spective lawmaking and an exploration of the nature of the public 
faith as it applied to the states and the nation. Nathaniel Ghorum 
of Massachusetts simply “doubted . . . the propriety of giving a ret-
rospective force to the restriction.”137 Madison offered a more sub-
tle contention, which rested on the notion that the states could not 
rid themselves of their obligations under prior acts of naturaliza-
tion by “repealing the law under which foreigners held their privi-
leges.”138 This strong affirmation of the norm of prospectivity laid 
the foundation for the rest of Madison’s contention: lacking power 
to repeal their laws, the states should not shed the obligations 
owed to citizens they previously naturalized by imposing retroac-
tive restrictions through the Constitution.139 Madison thus viewed 
prospective lawmaking as an essential element of the naturaliza-
tion power. James Wilson, himself a citizen of Pennsylvania who 
had emigrated from Scotland, also regarded a retrospective change 
as a breach of public faith. He pointed both to the naturalization 
laws of Pennsylvania and to the Articles of Confederation in con-
tending that Pennsylvania had pledged to her citizens of foreign 
birth “all the rights whatsoever of Citizens,” including citizenship 
in all the states.140 Others joined the chorus against retroactive re-
strictions on rights of naturalized citizens, although some still cau-
tioned against a rule that would admit foreigners too readily into 
the nation’s public councils.141
In the end, by a narrow vote of 5-6, the Convention rejected the 
proposal to exempt previously naturalized citizens from the seven-
year citizenship requirement for election to the House of Repre-
sentatives.142 But the vote should not be read as rejecting prospec-
tivity as an appropriate feature of the nation’s immigration policy. 
For one thing, the delegates were later to adopt a regime of 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 270–71. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 272. 
141 Id. at 271–72 (George Mason (Virginia)). 
142 Id. at 270–72. 
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prospectivity in defining qualifications for the office of the presi-
dency.143 Thus, naturalized citizens at the time of the Constitution’s 
adoption were eligible to the presidency on the same footing with 
natural-born citizens, even though the Constitution disqualified 
citizens naturalized in the future.144 The provision makes sense only 
as a bow to arguments for prospectivity. For another thing, the 
states that voted against the House qualifications motion (Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, Delaware, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, and Georgia) were those with the most restrictive immigration 
laws.145 One member of a restrictive state delegation, Charles 
Pinckney of South Carolina,146 explained the logic of his state’s 
negative vote because the “laws of the States had varied much the 
terms of naturalization in different parts of America . . . the U.S. 
could not be bound to respect them on [this] occasion.”147 Despite 
widespread support for honoring the interests of new citizens, 
Pinckney argued that the lack of uniformity among the states 
would prevent any citizen naturalized under the Articles of Con-
federation from legitimately expecting full political rights through-
out the country. 
Pinckney’s argument highlights the connection between uni-
formity and prospectivity in defining the operation of the naturali-
zation clause. If the lack of uniformity in the past might justify a 
degree of retroactivity in defining qualifications for members of the 
House, such arguments would carry little force as a justification for 
143 See id. at 536. 
144 The presidential qualification requirement declares that no person shall be eligi-
ble to the office of the President, except for “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of 
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution.” U.S. Const. art. 
II, § 1, cl. 5. Thus, while citizens naturalized after the Constitution took effect were 
excluded from the highest office, those whose naturalization had taken effect before 
its adoption were eligible. This provided the very prospectivity that the Convention 
had rejected in connection with the qualifications for membership in the House. In 
addition, the fourteen-year residency requirement was framed, like the age require-
ment, to apply to all candidates, including both natural-born and naturalized citizens. 
Somewhat curiously, in light of the debate over the qualifications of the House and 
Senate, the presidential qualification provision was adopted without recorded debate 
or controversy. See 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 536. 
145 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 272. 
146 As we have seen, South Carolina took the position that a private bill was neces-
sary to admit naturalized citizens to the full rights of political participation in that 
state. See Kettner, supra note 63, at 86. 
147 2 Farrand, supra note 117, at 271. 
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retrospective lawmaking under the new Constitution. The whole 
point of the naturalization clause was to eliminate state-to-state 
variation and to encourage Congress to fashion a single uniform 
rule throughout the country.148 Thus, the two elements of the natu-
ralization clause—the uniformity requirement and the requirement 
that Congress establish a relatively stable system of naturaliza-
tion—operate in tandem to ensure a measure of respect for the re-
liance interests of those seeking citizenship. Pinckney, and the 
delegates who found his argument persuasive, were not so much 
rejecting prospectivity as suggesting that it await the creation of a 
nationally uniform system under the new Constitution.149
III. NATURALIZATION POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
If the Framers of the Constitution subscribed to norms of uni-
formity and prospectivity in naturalization law, members of Con-
gress studiously adhered to these norms during the Federalist era. 
This Part reviews the legislative debates that led to the adoption of 
the naturalization laws of 1790, 1795, and 1798. As we show, mem-
bers of Congress were careful to observe norms of prospectivity 
and refused, apparently on constitutional grounds, to take action 
on petitions for favorable private naturalization laws. Equally re-
vealing, they regarded the formation of naturalization rules as tan-
tamount to the construction of an immigration policy for the new 
nation. 
A. The Naturalization Act of 1790 and the Refusal of Congress to 
Proceed by Private Bill 
Acting “to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,”150 Con-
gress adopted legislation in 1790 that imposed a limited set of 
qualifications for admission to citizenship. Aliens were eligible for 
citizenship if they were “free white person[s]” who “shall have re-
sided” for at least two years “within the limits and under the juris-
148 See id. at 235. 
149 For the suggestion that relatively uniform and stable rules have a stronger claim 
to immunity from retroactive changes, see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal 
Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1105–06 (1997). 
150 1790 Act, supra note 34, at 103. 
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diction of the United States.”151 Aliens were also required to show 
good character and to promise, by oath or affirmation, to support 
the Constitution.152 The proceedings on the alien’s application were 
to be held in “any common law court of record, in any one of the 
states wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year at 
least.”153 Contrary to some accounts,154 this formulation apparently 
empowered both state and federal courts to entertain naturaliza-
tion petitions.155 Finally, the Act provided that “the clerk of such 
court shall record such application, and the proceedings 
thereon.”156 From that point, the person was to “be considered as a 
citizen of the United States.”157
This provision followed its British predecessor in specifying a 
uniform rule of naturalization for administration by common law 
courts of record.158 The Act made citizenship uniformly available 
throughout the United States on relatively generous terms, at least 
for free white persons, and ensured the creation of a record to 
memorialize the new status. In contrast to the seven-year residency 
required in Parliament’s Act of 1740 and in some state provisions, 
the Act of 1790 required only two years’ residence in the country 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576 (1926) (dating the performance of 
the function of naturalization by the federal district courts to the “Act of January 29, 
1795” rather than to the 1790 Act); cf. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: 
The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, at 90 (1997) (noting that the 1790 Act did not spec-
ify that federal courts were to hear naturalization petitions, did not confer jurisdiction 
on them to do so, and would present Article III difficulties to the extent that it 
enlisted the federal courts in ex parte proceedings). 
155 The minute book of the federal district court in New York, for example, includes 
naturalization entries that date from shortly after the 1790 Act took effect. See Min-
utes and Rolls of Attorneys of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, 1789–1841, Roll 1, Target 1, Slide 36 (Nov. 2, 1790), microformed on Nat’l 
Archives of the United States, M886 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm Publ’n) (recording the 
conclusion of Judge James Duane that one Philip Dubey had resided in the United 
States for two years and in New York City for at least one year and was “a person of 
good character” and was entitled to take the oath for admission to citizenship, which 
“was administered to the said Philip Dubey accordingly”). By giving Dubey credit for 
periods of residence that pre-dated the passage of the 1790 Act, the court gave the 
statute the prospective effect that its drafters apparently contemplated. See infra note 
196. 
156 1790 Act, supra note 34, at 103–04. 
157 Id. at 104. 
158 See Kettner, supra note 63, at 74. 
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and one year’s residence in the state in which application for citi-
zenship was made.159 By placing the determinations in courts of re-
cord, moreover, the Act ruled out any private role for legislative 
assemblies, with one minor and quite revealing exception.160 The 
Act provided that aliens previously “proscribed” by act of the state 
assembly could not apply for citizenship under the national system 
until they first secured a reversal of their proscription.161 One can 
understand this proviso as a limited accommodation of the norm of 
prospectivity: individuals that the state assemblies had banished for 
disloyalty during the Revolution could not reclaim their citizenship 
until the state banishment was overturned. Apart from this role in 
159 Compare An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein 
Mentioned, as Are Settled, or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in Amer-
ica, 1740, 13 Geo. II, c. 7 (Eng.), with 1790 Act, supra note 34. 
160 The process of admission to citizenship entailed a genuine review of the record 
and could result in a denial of the petition. This is illustrated by the denial of Peter 
Vauttes’s citizenship petition: 
 At a special District Court of the United States held for the New York Dis-
trict at the City of New York on Tuesday the Fifteenth Day of January 1799 at 
11 O’Clock 
 PRESENT 
 The Honorable John Hobart Esquire 
 Judge of the District 
 The Court was opened by Proclamation 
 Joseph King at present of the City of New York but late of Great Britain 
Shoe manufacturer age thirty-eight years and John Dawson at present of the 
same City and late of Great Brian wine and Peter Vauttes aged twenty seven 
years severally came into court and applied to be admitted to become Citizens 
of the United States of America pursuant to the Directions of the acts of Con-
gress of the said United States entitled “An Act to establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization and to repeal the Act heretofore passed on that Subject” and 
said Joseph King, and John Dawson having thereupon severally produced to 
the Court such evidence and made such Declaration and Renunciation by the 
said Act is required. 
 It is considered by the Court that the said Joseph King and John Dawson be 
and they are hereby respectively admitted to be Citizens of the United States of 
America.  
Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 1789-1841, Roll 1, Target 3, Slide 21 (Jan. 15, 1799), micro-
formed on Nat’l Archives of the United States, M866 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm 
Publ’n). 
161 1790 Act, supra note 34, at 104. The Act referred to state legislative measures 
adopted during the Revolutionary War that proclaimed the disloyalty of certain per-
sons, named in the acts, and provided for the confiscation of their property. 
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removing previous state proscriptions, however, state assemblies 
were excluded from the naturalization process.162
Debates leading up to the adoption of the first naturalization bill 
reveal much about the perceived connection between naturaliza-
tion, land ownership, and immigration policy. Representative 
Laurance (New York) summarized these connected ideas well: 
“The reason of admitting foreigners to the rights of citizenship 
amongst us, is, the encouragement of emigration, as we have a 
large tract of country to people.”163 Like his colleagues, Laurance 
assumed that only citizens could own land and that, by defining the 
right to acquire citizenship, Congress would effectively be estab-
lishing an immigration policy for the new nation. The recognized 
link between immigration and the land did not settle every ques-
tion. Members debated how long a residency period to require and 
whether to establish gradations of citizenship that would admit 
aliens to progressively greater privileges over time. In other words, 
members sought to calibrate citizenship requirements with a view 
toward attracting “worthy” immigration. But nothing suggested 
that the essential identity between rules of naturalization and rules 
of immigration was questioned by the Framers. 
James Madison recognized the connection in urging a middle 
way on immigration matters. The goal of the naturalization rule 
162 However, there remained confusion over the states’ role in naturalization. “What 
the discussions and act of 1790 did not clarify was whether Congress’s control over 
naturalization was now to be exclusive or whether it was merely to supplement state 
acts.” Kettner, supra note 63, at 238–39. The statute “did nothing to settle questions 
respecting the spheres of authority of the state and national governments, and many 
states continued to administer their own naturalization laws.” Id. at 239. As Kettner 
explains: 
It was the considered opinion of the judges of the federal circuit court of Penn-
sylvania that the Constitution’s clause was designed “to guard against too nar-
row, instead of too liberal, a mode of conferring the rights of citizenship.” The 
individual states could not exclude those adopted by the United States, but they 
could adopt citizens on easier terms that those which Congress “may deem it 
expedient to impose.” 
Id. (quoting Collett v. Collett, 2. U.S. (2 Dall.) 294, 296 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792)). That con-
fusion has since been resolved. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 
419 (1948) (holding that states “can neither add to nor take from the conditions law-
fully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens”). 
163 Cong. Reg. (Feb. 3, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Laurance (New York)), reprinted in 
12 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of Amer-
ica: Debates in the House of Representatives 148 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1994) 
[hereinafter 12 DHFFC]. 
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was to “hold out as many inducements as possible, for the worthy 
part of mankind to come and settle amongst us.”164 The aim was 
“[n]ot merely to swell the catalogue of people [but] to [i]ncrease 
the wealth and strength of the community.”165 It was not enough 
that aliens take an oath to reside in the country, as an early draft of 
the legislation had proposed.166 Rather, it was necessary to “require 
residence as an essential.”167 This would help to ensure that every-
one who gained the privilege of citizenship would be “a real addi-
tion to the wealth or strength of the United States.”168 Madison 
worried in particular about the possibility of absentee landowners, 
those who might take the oath and gain citizenship but later “re-
turn to the country from which they came.” An actual residence 
requirement would reduce the anti-republican threat of absentee 
landlords, like the large landowners in Ireland who had chosen to 
live in England.169
Just as the drafters of the bill sought to foreclose absentee land-
ownership through a somewhat more demanding residency re-
quirement, they also worried about welcoming the impoverished 
and insecure. By limiting naturalization to “free” persons, the Act 
164 Id. (remarks of Rep. Madison (Virginia)). 
165 Id. 
166 The initial draft would have provided rights of citizenship for those who gave 
oaths of allegiance to, and of residence in, the United States, and who had actually 
resided in the country for one year. The draft went on to declare that naturalized citi-
zens would gain the additional right to hold office under the state or general govern-
ment after a residence of two additional years. See id. at 146. The draft was contro-
versial for its relatively short terms of residence, its progressive definition of the rights 
of citizens, and its treatment of the right of naturalized citizens to hold office, particu-
larly at the state level. 
167 Id. at 149. 
168 Id. 
169 This was no mere hypothetical possibility. In January 1790, just before debating 
the naturalization law, the House considered a petition from one H.W. Dobbyn, an 
Irish landowner, who sought a land grant of 50,000 acres and citizenship in the United 
States. See infra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. Dobbyn planned to sell the 
land to his tenant farmers, relocating them from Ireland to the frontier. Madison may 
have seen Dobbyn as an absentee landlord in the making. During debate on the peti-
tion, Roger Sherman wanted to know if the petitioner “intended coming here to set-
tle.” 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 49. Later in the debate over the naturalization 
law, one member argued that absentee ownership might deserve consideration if only 
to facilitate foreign investment secured by mortgages on land in the United States. 
See id. at 164 (remarks of Rep. Clymer (Pennsylvania)). But see id. at 165 (remarks of 
Rep. Jackson (Georgia)) (arguing that allegiance and land ownership go together and 
opposing Clymer’s notion of absentee ownership). 
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precluded indentured servants from gaining admission to citizen-
ship. Obviously, this barrier to citizenship would end with the expi-
ration of the term of indentured servitude set forth in the contract, 
often a period of four to five years (or with freedom in the case of 
slaves). By then, the former servant would have satisfied the resi-
dency requirement and would qualify for admission to citizenship. 
Some members of the House also wished to avoid extending an in-
vitation to “the common class of vagrants, paupers, and other out-
casts of Europe.”170 To strike the proper balance, the applicant for 
citizenship should spend time on probation and then “bring testi-
monials of a proper and decent behaviour.”171 If such a rule dis-
suaded “bad men” from immigrating, so be it; the nation would be 
better off “keep[ing them] out of the country, than admit[ting] 
them into it.”172 In contrast to those who demanded good behavior, 
others favored easy terms of naturalization “in order to people our 
country”; these supporters of easy admission believed that criminal 
laws would suffice “to restrain and regulate the conduct of an indi-
vidual.”173 Although they differed on the particulars, in short, 
members of the House agreed that whatever rule of naturalization 
they adopted would operate in effect as a rule of immigration. 
Two other features of the law deserve notice. First, unlike its 
English precursor, it contains no religious test for admission to citi-
zenship; as Representative Page (Virginia) explained, “[i]t is noth-
ing to us, whether Jews, or Roman Catholics, settle amongst us; . . . 
neither their religious [nor their] political opinions can injure us.”174 
Members of the First Congress not only excluded state assemblies 
from the naturalization process, but they also viewed themselves as 
having little role to play once the law was in place. For the first 
several decades of its existence, Congress refrained from adopting 
170 Id. at 151 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)); see also id. at 155 (remarks of 
Rep. Burke (South Carolina)) (expressing a desire to interdict the “convicts and 
criminals which they pour out of British jails”); id. at 147 (remarks of Rep. Sherman 
(Connecticut)) (expressing concern with emigrants who were likely to become 
“chargeable,” or impoverished). 
171 Id. at 151 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)). 
172 Id. at 151–52 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)). 
173 Id. at 153 (remarks of Rep. Laurance (New York)). 
174 Id. at 147. 
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private naturalization bills.175 This absence of congressional in-
volvement did not reflect a blanket refusal to adopt private legisla-
tion; indeed, private bills were a routine fact of life in the early 
years of the Republic.176 Congress handled an enormous range of 
such legislation in other areas, passing on such matters as claims 
for losses suffered during the Revolutionary War, claims by dis-
abled veterans for pensions, and claims for losses associated with 
invasions of property rights or breaches of public faith.177 But strik-
ingly, none of these early private bills operated to confer citizen-
ship on an alien.178
What accounts for the failure of Congress to adopt private natu-
ralization bills? The evidence suggests that members viewed the 
Constitution as foreclosing that form of naturalization.179 One can 
see this posture reflected in a variety of actions taken by Congress 
175 See generally Maguire, supra note 37. Indeed, John Quincy Adams publicly de-
clared that private bill practice was incompatible with separation of powers principles. 
Id. at 1. Of the nine private bills in the First Congress, none dealt with naturalization. 
Id. at 1, 10. 
176 Id.; see infra note 177. 
177 See William C. diGiancomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View 
from the First Congress, in The House and Senate in the 1790s: Petitioning, Lobbying, 
and Institutional Development 29, 47 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon 
eds., 2002) (noting that the “overwhelming majority” of petitions in the First Con-
gress were “direct by-products of the War for Independence”); see also James E. 
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and 
Government Accountability in the Early Republic (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/faculty-workshops.html 
(describing the use of private legislation to indemnify government officers held liable 
in tort for trespassory wrongs); Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of 
Grievances: Constitutional Development and Interpretations 81–83, 109–12 (1971) 
(unpublished dissertation, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
178 It was not until 1839, fifty years after the first public naturalization act, that Con-
gress adopted its first private naturalization bill. Maguire, supra note 37, at 10, app. 
D1, at 261. Even so, the private bill did not in terms confer citizenship on the peti-
tioner, but provided him with relief from a time bar that would have otherwise pre-
vented the district court of Maryland from updating the 1804 record of his naturaliza-
tion to correct its statement of his name. See An Act for the relief of Dr. John 
Campbell White, of Baltimore, in the state of Maryland, ch. 23, 6 Stat. 750, 750–51 
(1839). 
179 Private bills were certainly under consideration, both in connection with the 
Dobbyn petition, and in comments from Rep. Huntington (Connecticut), who re-
minded his colleagues that no person in his state can be naturalized “but by an act of 
the legislature.” 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 158. Although Huntington invited the 
House to leave the naturalization of foreigners to state legislatures, no one took the 
suggestion seriously. 
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in its early years. For starters, the First Congress considered a peti-
tion from one H.W. Dobbyn, an Irish landlord, who sought a grant 
of 50,000 acres of land from the public domain and the right to sell 
the land to his former tenants.180 The House tabled the petition af-
ter hearing from members that naturalization and land sales ought 
to be governed by general laws. Thus, Representative Smith (South 
Carolina) explained that 
The applicant was avowedly an alien; now, by the laws of this 
country, it was generally understood, that an alien cannot hold 
real estate; they may hold it as trustees, [but it would be a mis-
take] to encourage or countenance the holding of land by such a 
tenure. It ought also to be considered, that a committee is ap-
pointed who will probably report in a short time, the plan of uni-
form naturalization; now it would be impossible for the house at 
this time to judge whether an alien, holding lands in America, 
would be able to conform in all respects to such a law.181
A member of the House responded by suggesting that the House 
could overcome the difficulty by inserting a provision about citi-
zenship in the bill, but Representative Stone (Maryland) rejected 
the idea. It was simply not “proper, in his opinion, to make a natu-
ralization act to apply to an individual.”182
Members of the House returned to this theme in debates over 
changes to the naturalization law in 1795. Adopted late in Wash-
ington’s second term, while Chief Justice Jay was negotiating the 
treaty that bears his name and the United States was struggling to 
maintain neutrality in the face of European convulsions,183 the Act 
of 1795 primarily operated to lengthen the required term of resi-
180 See 8 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of 
America 196–98 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter 8 DHFFC] (re-
porting that Dobbyn had sold his estate in Ireland and wished to settle in America 
“with a large body of his former tenants”). For the discussion of Dobbyn’s petition, 
see The Daily Advertiser (Jan. 21, 1790), reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 
40. 
181 See Cong. Reg. (Jan. 20, 1790), reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 49. 
182 Id. 
183 See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early Ameri-
can Republic, 1788–1800, at 388–431 (1993) (describing the British attack on Ameri-
cans who were trading with French interests, the growing rancor towards Great Brit-
ain in 1794, the controversial terms of Jay’s treaty, and the treaty’s eventual 
ratification). 
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dence from two to five years and tighten the oath requirement. In 
the course of debates, members of the House considered how to 
treat those who had expatriated themselves from the United States 
and now sought to reclaim their citizenship. Following the ap-
proach of the Act of 1790, Representative Giles recommended that 
expatriates be required to obtain a special act of state legislature to 
obtain reinstatement. Representative Tracy (Connecticut) worried 
that such an approach would make repatriation too easy; he pro-
posed requiring expatriates to obtain a private bill from Congress 
as well.184
Although the Annals of Congress do not record the ensuing de-
bate in detail, it appears that members raised constitutional objec-
tions to the proposed reliance on private legislation: 
[Representative Tracy’s] motion was afterwards considered in 
several points of view, as blending State and Continental legisla-
tion, as interfering with the Legislative rights of the State by 
some, and as operating in the same manner in respect to the right 
reserved by the Constitution to the General Government, which 
is authorized to pass uniform laws of naturalization by others.185
One can see a variety of concerns reflected in this summary: con-
cerns grounded in federalism and the need to protect the role of 
State legislatures as well as concerns based on the prospect that 
state legislation would interfere with the paramount role of the 
general government. Critics apparently questioned as well the sug-
gested reliance on private legislation as inconsistent with the re-
quirement of a uniform law.186
Comments of John Quincy Adams at roughly the same time sug-
gest that doubts about the constitutionality of legislative acts of 
naturalization were entertained both in and out of Congress. 
Commenting on a proposed treaty that would have given the citi-
zens and subjects of the United States and England reciprocal ex-
emptions from all disabilities of alienage, Adams recognized that 
184 See 4 Annals of Cong. 1005 (1794). 
185 Id. 
186 See Frank George Franklin, The Legislative History of Naturalization in the 
United States 51 (1906) (noting that Tracy withdrew his motion, after constitutional 
objections were raised, and noting that his proposal “[c]ertainly . . . conflicted with the 
constitutional requirement of uniformity”). 
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such an arrangement would encourage trade and commerce but 
might be difficult to put in place. Adams indicated that such a pro-
posal would require an act of Parliament and would face a “more 
material obstacle” grounded in the Constitution.187 Adams was ap-
parently referring to the naturalization clause and its requirement 
of uniformity; indeed, he later raised constitutional objections to 
the Louisiana Purchase on the ground that “[i]t naturalizes foreign 
nations in a mass.”188 Adams’s concern offers important insights 
into early Republic thinking about the role of the legislature in 
naturalization proceedings. First, and most obviously, it suggests 
that Congress was limited to the adoption of public laws of general 
applicability and could not selectively naturalize aliens, either 
alone or in a group. Second, and more subtle, Adams obviously be-
lieved that the power of Congress to confer status short of full citi-
zenship was encompassed within the naturalization clause and 
regulated by its uniformity requirement. Neither the English pro-
posal nor the treaty underlying the Louisiana Purchase would con-
fer formal citizenship but Adams viewed both of the lesser forms of 
status as controlled by the Constitution’s uniformity rule. 
Having apparently concluded that the Constitution barred pri-
vate bills relating to citizenship, Congress acted to address in-
stances of perceived unfairness through the adoption of curative 
statutes that applied to everyone in the relevant class. Consider a 
telling piece of curative legislation, adopted in 1804.189 The legisla-
tion first responded to the problem of those who were residing in 
the United States between 1798 and 1802, at a time when Congress 
required a declaration of intent five years prior to their application 
for citizenship.190 This five-year declaration rule would have de-
layed admission to citizenship for some aliens who were otherwise 
qualified under the five-year residency and three-year declaration 
rules of the Act of 1802.191 Congress addressed the problem by sim-
187 Id. at 9 (quoting Adams’s diary). 
188 Id. at 10 (quoting 5 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 401 (Charles Francis Adams 
ed., 1875)). The Louisiana Purchase required that former French citizens of New Or-
leans enjoy the same privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States, even 
before Louisiana was admitted to statehood. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 712–14. 
189 See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 47, 2 Stat. 292 [hereinafter 1804 Act]. 
190 For a description of the law, see infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
191 See Franklin, supra note 186, at 110–15 (explaining that Congress passed the 1804 
remedial legislation in order to address the frequent private naturalization petitions it 
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ply eliminating the declaration requirement for the class of 1798–
1802.192 The legislation also responded to the problem of an alien 
who, though qualified for citizenship, had died before taking the 
oath that would have conferred formal citizenship status on him 
and his wife and minor children. The Act of 1804 addressed the 
problem by extending rights of citizenship to the widow and chil-
dren of the deceased, provided they took “the oaths prescribed by 
law.”193 In both instances, the Act sought to protect individuals 
from the unfair application of existing law, but did so by adopting 
rules of general application rather than special relief legislation.194
B. Early Congressional Adherence to the Norm of Prospectivity 
Apart from its refusal to adopt private bills, Congress acted on 
the principle that the Constitution required prospective legislation 
in the field of naturalization law. Interestingly, the concern with 
prospectivity arose during debates over the nation’s first naturali-
zation act in 1790. One might assume that the legislation creating 
the nation’s first system would not occasion such concerns. But re-
call that a number of aliens had been drawn to the United States by 
the rules of naturalization that were in place in the states in which 
they had taken up residence. Representative Smith (South Caro-
lina) called attention to the issue: “What is to become of those in-
choate rights of citizenship, which are not yet completed? Can the 
Government, by an ex post facto law, deprive an alien of the advan-
tage of such an inchoate right?”195
The Annals do not quote any direct answer to Smith’s query, al-
though the Act was drafted to address the concern. First, the two-
year residency requirement in the federal law was framed to credit 
aliens with any time they had spent as residents of the United 
received from those people unduly burdened because they came to the United States 
when the 1798 Act was in force). 
192 1804 Act, supra note 189, at 292–93. 
193 Id. at 293. 
194 Congress’s refusal to adopt private naturalization bills continued well into the 
nineteenth century. One Peter Jackson sought relief by petition, describing his arrival 
in the United States as a minor child, his marriage to a U.S. citizen, his service in the 
War of 1812, and his recent ejection from civil office on the basis that he was not a 
citizen. The House Judiciary Committee considered his petition but resolved that it 
should not be granted. For an account, see Franklin, supra note 186, at 169–70. 
195 1 Annals of Cong. 1123 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
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States before the law took effect.196 By giving aliens credit for ear-
lier periods of residency, the Act would lessen any retrospective ef-
fect. Second, by establishing a relatively short term of residency, 
the law provided easier terms of admission than those in place in 
many of the states, again moderating any retrospective effect. 
Subsequent legislative practice during the early Republic helps 
to cement our claim about the Framers’ commitment to prospec-
tive lawmaking. In January 1795, Congress adopted a second act to 
establish a uniform rule of naturalization.197 The legislation came at 
a time when the divisions between the Federalists and the Democ-
ratic-Republicans, including spats over citizenship, had grown 
sharper.198 Federalists spoke in terms of the importance of assuring 
that new immigrants were properly attached to republican princi-
ples; their concern was made all the more urgent by their recogni-
tion that newly naturalized citizens were likely to vote for the De-
mocratic-Republican party.199 The solution was to extend the 
period of required residency from two to five years and to demand 
a clearer oath or affirmation in support of the Constitution and a 
clearer renunciation of any titles of nobility and lingering alle-
giance to their former country.200
Despite the decision to tighten the standards for admission to 
citizenship, however, the drafters of the new legislation were care-
ful to make these changes prospectively. Section 1 contained the 
new five-year residency requirement.201 Section 2 declared that, for 
immigrants residing in the United States on January 29, 1795 (the 
196 The statute extended the privilege of citizenship to any alien “who shall have re-
sided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for a term of 
two years.” 1790 Act, supra note 34. Had the Act referred to aliens who “shall reside” 
in the United States, it might have been construed as giving aliens credit only for pe-
riods of residence that came after the Act’s effective date; by referring instead to 
aliens who “shall have resided,” the Act gave aliens credit for pre-Act periods of resi-
dence. 
197 See Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 [hereinafter 1795 Act]. 
198 See, e.g., Robert J. Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of 
Immigration Regulation, 19 Law & Hist. Rev. 645, 648–49 (2001). 
199 Id. See generally Douglas M. Bradburn, “True Americans” and “Hordes of For-
eigners”: Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Problem of Citizenship in the United States, 
1789–1800, 29 Hist. Reflections 19, 26 (2003) (explaining the Federalist worry “about 
a flood of [French] revolutionaries”). 
200 1795 Act, supra note 197, at 414. 
201 Id. 
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effective date of the Act), naturalization was to be available if they 
had resided for two years in the country and one year in the state 
of application.202 This was the same rule that had been established 
in the 1790 Act.203 Similarly, the Act of 1795 included a new re-
quirement, obliging candidates for citizenship to declare their in-
tent to become citizens after three years’ residence.204 Yet again, 
the provisions of Section 2 governing those already in the country 
contained no such prior-declaration requirement.205 Congress thus 
took care to maintain public faith not only with those who had 
gained citizenship under the earlier law but also with those non-
citizens who were residing in the United States in circumstances 
that entitled them to claim the benefit of the 1790 standards. As 
Nathan Dane explained in his popular abridgment, the provision 
assured that if an alien were “resident in the United States when 
this act was passed, he was admissible on the terms of the former 
act.”206
Congress continued to adjust the rule for naturalization and, 
with one important exception, honored its established practice of 
making only prospective changes in the law. The exception oc-
curred in 1798, at a time when hostilities with France led the Fed-
eralists to adopt a series of war measures over Jeffersonian objec-
202 Id. at 415. 
203 See 1790 Act, supra note 34, at 103–04. 
204 1795 Act, supra note 197, at 414. The record of James Pollock’s appearance be-
fore the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York illustrates 
the practical impact of the declaration requirement: 
 James Pollock now of the City of New York but late of ________ in the King-
dom of Ireland Merchant, aged forty eight years came in to Court and pursuant 
to the direction of the act of Congress of the United States of America entitled 
“an Act to Establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization and to Repeal the act 
heretofore passed on that subject” made oath that it is Bona Fide his intention 
to become a citizen of the United States and to Renounce forever all allegiance 
and fidelity to any foreign Prince, Potentate, Sate or Sovereign whatever and 
particularly to the King of Great Britain to whom he is a subject. 
 Thereupon 
 It is ordered by the Court that the oath or affidavit to made by the said James 
Pollock be subscribed by him and filed with the Clerk of the Court. 
Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 1789–1841, Roll 1, Target 2, Slide 300 (August 1, 1798), micro-
formed on Nat’l Archives of the United States, M866 (Nat’l Archives Microfilm 
Publ’n). 
205 1795 Act, supra note 197, at 415. 
206  4 Nathan Dane, A General Abridgment and Digest of American Law 710 (1824). 
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tions.207 As part of this package, the naturalization act of June 18, 
1798 took a number of drastic steps. It limited naturalization to 
those who had resided for fourteen years in the United States and 
for five years in the state of application.208 It also required aliens 
who wished to secure citizenship to make a declaration to that ef-
fect at least five years before applying for naturalization.209 Fur-
thermore, the Act created a central record-keeping system by 
obliging local courts to transmit a copy of naturalization records to 
the Secretary of State.210 Finally, the Act required all aliens who ei-
ther arrived, or continued to reside, in the country after the effec-
tive date of the Act to register as such with a federal officer.211
Those opposing the retroactive features of the law put forward 
two arguments. The first, advanced by Representative Smith, was 
squarely based on the Constitution: 
To adopt the resolution as reported would be, he believed, to 
agree upon an ex post facto regulation. It could not be intended, 
he should suppose, to prevent persons who had resided in this 
country two or three years, under the expectation of becoming 
citizens at the end of five years, from that privilege.212
In addition, members of the House appealed to fairness and a 
sense of justice. Representative Gallatin (Pennsylvania) observed 
that many aliens had sought naturalization under the terms of state 
law, mistakenly assuming that such a mode remained lawful.213 He 
207 See generally Steinfeld, supra note 198, at 648–49. On the quasi-war with France, 
and the politics that produced the Alien and Sedition Acts, see Elkins & McKitrick, 
supra note 183, at 590–93. On the connection between fears of French influence and 
the naturalization law, see 8 Annals of Cong. 1453 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Sitgreaves 
(Pennsylvania)) (noting the “number of French citizens in our country” and the real 
possibility of war with France); see also Bradburn, supra note 199, at 28–29 (describ-
ing the Federalist effort to define more narrowly the concept of American citizen-
ship). 
208 See Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566, 566 [hereinafter 1798 Act]. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 567. 
211 Id. at 567–68. 
212 8 Annals of Cong. 1569 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Smith (Maryland)). Smith’s re-
marks pre-dated Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), in which the Supreme 
Court concluded that the prohibition against ex post facto laws applied only to those 
that imposed retroactive criminal liability. Id. at 390–91. 
213 See, e.g., Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 259–61 (1817) (recounting that 
one John Chirac, a French citizen, first invoked the Maryland naturalization proce-
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argued against retroactive changes by urging Congress to give 
aliens resident before the passage of the 1795 Act, and those who 
had made the declaration required in 1795, a limited opportunity to 
seek naturalization under its provisions.214 Representative Craik 
(Maryland), although inclined to foreclose new immigration alto-
gether, agreed that retrospective changes in the rules governing 
resident aliens were “unjust.”215
The arguments of Reps. Smith, Gallatin, and Craik prevailed, re-
sulting in a significant moderation of the retroactive features of the 
law. For aliens who established residence before the 1795 Act be-
came law, citizenship was to be available without a declaration 
upon proof of five years’ residence; aliens were given one year to 
take advantage of this saving clause.216 For those who established 
residence in the United States after the effective date of the 1795 
Act, and were entitled under those provisions to naturalization af-
ter five years’ residency and a proper declaration, the 1798 Act 
permitted them to seek naturalization on the basis of five years’ 
residency for a period of four years from the date of their declara-
tion.217 In both respects, then, even the relatively harsh terms of the 
1798 Act were significantly moderated in response to arguments 
that the Constitution permitted only prospective rule changes in 
the naturalization arena. 218
dure in 1795 and then subsequently petitioned for naturalization under the laws of the 
United States in July 1798, shortly after the restrictive naturalization law of that year 
took effect). 
214 Representative Gallatin argued that many aliens believed themselves to have 
been lawfully naturalized, because they were naturalized under state laws (apparently 
in contravention of norms of federal exclusivity). See 8 Annals of Cong. 1776–79 
(1798). He found it unfair that such aliens would have “no opportunity” to become 
naturalized under the proposed Act. Franklin, supra note 186, at 86. Accordingly, 
“[h]e would give a limited period during which these might still have the benefit of the 
existing law.” Id. 
215 8 Annals of Cong. 1779 (1798) (Rep. Craik (Maryland)) (expressing the view that 
the proposed retroactive operation of the law to bar resident aliens from securing 
naturalized citizenship “would be very unjust” and agreeing with Gallatin that “a 
large class of persons” had either failed as yet to seek naturalization or had mistak-
enly sought it under the laws of Maryland and Virginia); Franklin, supra note 186, at 
87. 
216 See 1798 Act, supra note 208, at 566–67. 
217 Id. 
218 To the extent that the 1798 Act retained a flavor of retroactivity, one might view 
the provisions as the product of some political gamesmanship; the Federalists no 
doubt recognized that many of the aliens whose citizenship was complicated by these 
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Despite these moderating features, the 1798 Act was quickly 
countermanded when the Jeffersonians took control of Congress. 
The Act of April 14, 1802 repealed the 1798 provisions, and substi-
tuted a new regime that was to last, with minor adjustments, for the 
remainder of the nineteenth century.219 Under the new rules, an 
alien was required to reside in the United States for five years and 
to reside in the state of application for one year.220 Moreover, the 
alien was required to declare an intent to seek citizenship at least 
three years prior to making an application for naturalization.221 To-
gether, these two provisions returned the rules of naturalization to 
those that had prevailed in 1795.222 Finally, aliens arriving after the 
effective date of the act were required to register with a federal of-
ficer.223 By thus limiting the registration requirement to new arri-
vals, the Act made clear that those already residing in the United 
States in 1802 owed no such obligation. In effect, then, by repealing 
the prior law, the Act granted amnesty to all the individuals who 
maneuvers would, if naturalized, have likely voted for the Democrat-Republicans in 
the 1798 mid-term elections. See Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of 
Citizenship in U.S. History 163 (1997) (arguing that Federalist nativism had driven 
immigrant voters to Jefferson’s Republican Party). Jefferson shared the view that 
naturalization policy was driven at least in part by political considerations. See Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 18, 1797), reprinted in Letters and 
Addresses of Thomas Jefferson 116 (William B. Parker & Jonas Viles eds., 1905) (ar-
guing that the British were influencing American politics by securing naturalized citi-
zenship, such that these “foreign and false citizens now constitute the great body of 
what are called our merchants, fill our sea ports, are planted in every little town and 
district of the interior country, sway everything in the former places by their own 
votes, and those of their dependents”). One might also view this statutory provision as 
a reflection of common law notions of the restricted rights of alien enemies during 
wartime. See Neuman, Strangers, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that “Madison viewed as 
fundamental the distinction between alien enemies and alien friends . . . [and] [a]s to 
alien enemies, the Constitution’s grant of the war power gave Congress the usual au-
thority under the law of nations”). Importantly, the Act applies to all applicants for 
naturalized citizenship, not just to those from France. See 1798 Act, supra note 208, at 
566–67. 
219 See Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153 [hereinafter 1802 Act]. See generally 
Kettner, supra note 63, at 246 (describing the 1802 Act as the “last major piece of leg-
islation” on the subject of naturalization during the nineteenth century). 
220 See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 153–54. 
221 See id. at 153. 
222 The Kentucky Palladium reported that the object of the 1802 bill was to repeal 
the Act of 1798 and go back to the terms of 1795. See Franklin, supra note 186, at 
106–07. 
223 See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 154. 
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had failed to comply with the registration requirement of the 1798 
legislation.224 The Act also took pains to eliminate the retroactive 
features of prior law.225 Thus, for the class of 1790–1795, the Act re-
stored the two-year residency requirement (even though, as a prac-
tical matter, many members of this class could have satisfied the 
five-year term specified in the 1798 law). For much of the remain-
der of the nineteenth century (with the notable exception of legis-
lation in the 1880s that led to Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting), 
Congress continued to emphasize prospectivity in its immigration 
legislation, frequently employing savings clauses to preserve rights 
conferred under earlier laws.226
C. The Scope of Congress’s Naturalization Power 
Early legislation also resolved some uncertainty over the extent 
to which the exercise of federal power over naturalization was 
thought to exclude any concurrent role for the states in defining 
the rights of aliens. While early decisions of the courts took some-
what conflicting views of the exclusive character of Congress’s 
naturalization authority,227 Congress addressed the issue in the 1802 
Act. The focus of section 4 of the Act was on the citizenship status 
of the children of those naturalized under earlier laws.228 The Act 
declared minor children citizens of the United States if their par-
224 Franklin, supra note 186, at 108–09. 
225 See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 154. 
226 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 531 (1955) (noting that savings 
clauses that involved broad inclusive provisions had been employed since 1906 and 
“manifested an intention on the part of Congress to save rights which had accrued 
under prior laws”). 
227 Compare Collet v. Collet, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 294, 295–96 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792) (states 
retain right to naturalize), and Portier v. LeRoy, 1 Yeates 371 (Pa. 1794) (same), with 
United States v. Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 370, 372 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (states lack power 
to naturalize). See also Neuman, Strangers, supra note 3, at 44–49. Neuman argues 
that well into the nineteenth century, states continued to regulate immigration. 
Rather than expressly regulating immigration, states exercised their police power to 
limit the type of immigrants who could enter the state. Pointing to the majority’s dicta 
in City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), in which the opinion states 
that it was “competent and . . . necessary for a state to provide precautionary meas-
ures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts,” id. at 
142, Neuman concludes that the Supreme Court generally approved of such legisla-
tion, as long as it did not interfere with Congress’s foreign commerce power. Neuman, 
Strangers, supra note 3, at 45–48. 
228 See 1802 Act, supra note 219, at 155. 
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ent(s) had been duly naturalized “under any of the laws of the 
United States” or under the laws “of any one of the said states.”229 
But naturalization under state law counted only if it took place 
“previous to the passing of any law on that subject, by the govern-
ment of the United States.”230 State naturalizations were thus effec-
tive only until Congress adopted the Act of 1790, and were invalid 
thereafter. As Dane explained, this provision “tends to settle the 
long agitated question, whether a State government has any power 
to naturalize aliens, since Congress passed laws on the subject.”231 
(The legislation, declaring federal power exclusive of the states, re-
calls the 1773 Act of Parliament declaring Britain’s naturalization 
regime exclusive of those in the colonies.) 
Early legislative practice sheds light on one final puzzle about 
the breadth of Congress’s power over naturalization policy. An 
early draft of the 1790 naturalization law specified gradations of 
citizenship: Aliens could own property after one year but would 
have to wait two years before they could stand for election to state 
and federal offices.232 During debates over these provisions, some 
took the position that Congress’s power was limited to conferring 
citizenship and did not extend to the definition of gradations of 
citizenship.233 Others took quite the opposite position, urging that 
229 Id. 
230 Id. Congress may have attempted to resolve the issue in the 1795 Act, declaring 
that an alien may be admitted as a “citizen of the United States, or any of them, on 
the following conditions, and not otherwise.” 1795 Act, supra note 197, at 414. One 
can read the provision as an attempt by Congress to preempt state control of the field 
of naturalization. 
231 4 Dane, supra note 206, at 711; see also Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 
269 (1817) (Marshall, C.J.) (proclaiming a consensus that Congress has sole power to 
naturalize). The consensus doubtless emerged in the nineteenth century; we have a 
great deal of evidence that state naturalizations continued through the 1790s. See, 
e.g., Franklin, supra note 186, at 84–90 (explaining that the difficulty in complying 
with federal naturalization requirements resulted in many aliens turning to state pro-
cedures for naturalization); see also supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (Rep. 
Gallatin recounting the continuing efforts of immigrants in Pennsylvania to seek natu-
ralization under state law). 
232 In particular, the bill would have conferred all rights of citizenship, including 
property ownership, to those who took the oath and resided in the United States for a 
single year. The right to hold public office would ripen after two years. See Cong. 
Reg. (Feb. 3, 1790), reprinted in 12 DHFFC, supra note 163, at 146. 
233 See id. at 151 (remarks of Rep. White (Virginia)) (once an alien attains citizen-
ship, the power of Congress ceases to operate); see also id. at 148 (remarks of Rep. 
Laurance (New York)) (questioning Congress’s power to specify the rights of a new 
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all incidents of the status of resident aliens and new citizens were 
subject to federal regulation.234 Ultimately, Congress decided to 
drop the gradation provisions in favor of a rule that simply speci-
fied the terms on which citizenship was to be conferred. But one 
cannot conclude from the omission of gradations that Congress 
reached a considered conclusion that its power did not extend so 
far. To the contrary, the degree of state-to-state variability on is-
sues relating to property ownership and political rights would have 
made the task of framing a uniform rule quite daunting.235 Many 
may have concluded that, whatever the scope of federal power, it 
was better to leave the issue to the states. Thus, William Maclay’s 
diary records his view that Congress possessed the power in ques-
tion, but that the interests of Pennsylvania would be better served 
if federal law did not define alien property rights.236
citizen to stand for state election); cf. id. at 149 (remarks of Rep. Madison (Virginia)) 
(noting that the ability of Congress to admit an alien to rights “step by step” poses 
questions “of some nicety”). Madison had earlier taken the position that Congress 
would have power to establish gradations of citizenship. 
234 See id. at 153 (remarks of Rep. Tucker (South Carolina)) (expressing “no doubt” 
as to Congress’s power to provide for progressive admission to citizenship); id. at 155–
56 (remarks of Rep. Stone (Maryland)) (supporting the claim that Congress can admit 
to citizenship “step by step”); New-York Daily Gazette, Feb. 4, 1790, reprinted in id. 
at 156 (remarks of Rep. Jackson (Georgia)) (citing Blackstone’s discussion in support 
of the progressive admission to rights of citizenship). 
235 Cong. Reg. (Feb. 3, 1790), reprinted in id. at 150 (remarks of Rep. Smith (South 
Carolina)) (noting that the proposed grant of political rights to the newly arrived 
might cause “great uneasiness” in some “neighborhoods”). 
236 See William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 8, 1790), in 9 Documentary History of the First 
Federal Congress of the United States 214–15 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit 
eds., 1988) [hereinafter 9 DHFFC] (noting the introduction of the naturalization bill 
and recounting his efforts to authorize aliens to own lands before becoming citizens); 
William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 9, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 215–16 (recounting his 
opposition to the two-year residency requirement as too restrictive and contrasting 
the willingness of those in Pennsylvania to “rec[eive] and adopt[] strangers” with the 
reluctance of those in New England); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 12, 1790), in 9 
DHFFC, supra, at 217 (noting that Pennsylvania has been “very liberal on the subject 
of admitting strangers to citizenship” and that “we have benefited by it [and] still do 
benefit”); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 15, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 218–19 (re-
counting his view that others wish to deprive Pennsylvania of the benefit of 
“[im]migration” as a “source of population” and thus linking naturalization with im-
migration policy); William Maclay, Diary (Mar. 17, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 220–
21 (recounting Ellsworth’s argument that power to hold lands was a feature of natu-
ralization and was not properly extended to aliens until they were naturalized); Wil-
liam Maclay, Diary (Mar. 18, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 222 (noting a division be-
tween senators as to whether federal authority under the naturalization clause 
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Despite its failure to confer explicit rights on resident aliens 
short of full citizenship, Congress clearly took the view that the re-
liance interests of such resident aliens deserved protection against 
retroactive legislation. As we have already seen, the comments of 
Representative Smith and the language of the 1790 Act both ex-
press some solicitude for the interests of those who had come to 
America in reliance on the naturalization provisions of state law.237 
The first naturalization act, moreover, left the decision to seek citi-
zenship or remain as a resident alien in the hands of the immigrant. 
Thus, the statute prescribed the conditions that would qualify an 
alien for citizenship: race, residency, good character, and an oath to 
support the Constitution. But the statute did not require that the 
alien get in line for citizenship by filing a declaration to that effect 
as a condition of his entry into the country.238 Nor did the statute 
establish a period of limitations that would foreclose citizenship for 
those who had lived in the country for a time without having taken 
steps to secure citizenship. In other words, the statute contem-
plated that aliens might live for years in the United States as deni-
zens, domiciliaries, or permanent residents, entitled to citizenship if 
they chose to pursue it but not required to do so as a condition of 
continued residence.239
In addition, it was this group of prospective or “inchoate” citi-
zens that Congress sought to protect from retrospective legislation 
in its second naturalization law. The statute adopted in 1795 al-
tered the rules significantly, extending the residency period to five 
embraced the power to define property ownership rights of aliens and noting that 
Ellsworth and Strong both took a broad view of federal power); William Maclay, Di-
ary (Mar. 19, 1790), in 9 DHFFC, supra, at 223 (concluding that since the Pennsyl-
vania senators could not “get the rights of [aliens to hold] property fully acknowl-
edged, it is best that the Naturalization bill say nothing about it”). 
237 See supra notes 155, 195–96 and accompanying text. 
238 Thus, the 1790 Act contained nothing that would require the alien to register or 
declare an interest in citizenship and nothing that foreclosed citizenship to aliens who 
had waited too long before petitioning for naturalization. 
239 Denizens were aliens who were admitted to some, but not all, of the privileges of 
citizenship through the issuance of the King’s letters patent. Blackstone explained the 
matter as follows: “A denizen is an alien born, but who has obtained . . . letters patent 
to make him an English subject. . . . A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an 
alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them.” 1 Blackstone, supra 
note 25, at *374; see also Craw v. Ramsay, Vaughan 274, 124 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1074 
(1670) (“[A] denizen of England by letters patents for life, in tayl, or in fee, whereby 
he becomes a subject in regard of his person.”). 
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years and requiring a declaration of intent to seek citizenship after 
three years. These changes would have no impact on those that had 
already gained citizenship under the 1790 law. As we have seen, 
however, the 1795 legislation allows denizens or lawful permanent 
resident aliens already in the country to pursue citizenship on the 
same terms that had previously applied to them. Only those aliens 
who entered the country after the effective date of the statute were 
subject to the new dispensation. The statute thus recognizes a use-
ful distinction between Congress’s plenary power over the rules of 
naturalization that apply to newly admitted aliens and its obliga-
tion to preserve the rules applicable to those who had already 
moved to the United States and established a residence here in re-
liance on an earlier approach. 
To summarize the lessons of this Part of the Article, the framing 
of the Constitution proceeded on the assumption that Congress 
was to establish a single uniform rule of naturalization throughout 
the United States. Members of the early Congresses understood 
the constitutional requirement of uniformity both as obliging Con-
gress to adopt public laws of general applicability on the subject, 
and as ruling out private bills. Moreover, Congress took the posi-
tion that uniformity disables the states from administering their 
own separate or concurrent system of naturalization. Finally, the 
clause, requiring Congress to establish a uniform rule, suggests the 
foreclosure of retrospective changes in the rules. Congress viewed 
the trigger for the assurance of prospectivity as beginning when an 
alien established lawful residence in the United States. At that 
point, Congress viewed itself as bound to refrain from making ret-
roactive changes in the rules that govern the alien’s status and 
eventual admission to citizenship. 
IV. RECLAIMING THE IMMIGRATION CONSTITUTION OF THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC 
We think these underappreciated features of the early Repub-
lic’s approach to immigration issues have important implications 
for current debates over immigration law. In this Part, we develop 
three related ideas. First, we contend that the requirement of an es-
tablished rule of naturalization provides additional support for im-
posing limits on some kinds of retroactive legislation and some fea-
tures of the so-called plenary power doctrine. Scholars have 
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couched arguments against retroactive legislation in due process 
terms; we think our interpretation of the naturalization clause bol-
sters these arguments and provides a firm constitutional founda-
tion for a requirement of prospective lawmaking by Congress.240
Second, we argue that the requirement of an established and 
uniform rule forecloses the adoption of private bills. We view the 
rise of private legislation as an unfortunate feature of modern im-
migration and naturalization policy. Members of Congress have 
sometimes adopted harsh general measures to govern most citizen-
ship applicants and have simultaneously supported private bills 
that would set aside these harsh measures in specific cases. We 
think legislative lenity can play an appropriate role in the process 
of naturalization (as the curative legislation of the Jeffersonian era 
reveals), but it should apply across the board to all aliens in the 
same situation. Indeed, we see a connection between the two de-
velopments: once Congress came to view itself as enjoying the 
power to address citizenship issues in particular cases, it was but a 
short leap to the abandonment of the commitment to prospectivity 
that had characterized its early legislation.241
Finally, we think that the limits of plenary power and the prohi-
bition on private bills also shed light on the propriety of treating 
immigration and naturalization issues as matters of “public right” 
to be shunted off to executive tribunals and immunized from judi-
cial review. Properly understood, the public rights doctrine does 
not provide carte blanche to Congress in regulating matters be-
tween the government and individual aliens. Instead, as we show, 
the doctrine should come into play only where Congress retains 
control over the distribution of government largesse, as in the case 
of its control over government benefits under the property or ap-
propriations power. Congress has no case-by-case control over 
naturalization that can provide a foundation for the denial of a ju-
dicial role.242
240 See David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process Limits 
on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2482 (1998) (“Not 
coincidentally, the most extreme restrictions the 1996 Congress enacted fell on the 
doubly disadvantaged, noncitizens who have been convicted of crimes.”). 
241 See Act of Feb. 13, 1839, ch. 23, 6 Stat. 750, 750–51 (granting relief to a Balti-
more-based physician, Dr. John Campbell White). 
242 We find confirmation of our suggestion that the public rights doctrine does not 
undercut the right of aliens, who are resident in the United States, to secure judicial 
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Our proposed revival of early Republic constitutionalism has its 
risks and drawbacks. One cannot always readily translate the 
norms of the eighteenth century into a body of constitutional rules 
for today. But in the case of immigration law, the developments of 
the early Republic have important lessons to teach us. Rather than 
viewing the plenary power doctrine through the lens of the nation’s 
restrictive attitude toward new immigration in the late nineteenth 
century, the experience of the early Republic helps us to locate a 
constitutional history in which leading statesmen welcomed the 
idea of national growth through immigration. To be sure, the 
Framers had quite limited ideas about the sort of immigrants they 
expected to naturalize: only white European immigrants were wel-
come. But within those boundaries, the Framers established and 
administered a system of naturalization rules that displayed a strik-
ing degree of solicitude for the rights of resident aliens. 
A. Understanding the Relevance of the Naturalization Clause 
Before we turn to specific arguments, however, we address a 
more general question of interpretive theory. We propose to apply 
the limits on congressional power encompassed in the naturaliza-
tion clause to all issues of immigration and naturalization law, in-
cluding matters that do not directly implicate citizenship. One 
might object on methodological grounds to the proposed reliance 
on eighteenth-century naturalization law as a source of modern 
constitutional limits on the role of Congress in immigration law. 
Apart from objections based on concerns with originalist method-
ology, one might take the view (common among students of immi-
gration law) that immigration and naturalization comprise two 
fundamentally different compartments of law. If one accepted this 
categorical view, it might seem to follow that the constitutional lim-
its on Congress’s naturalization power do not apply to immigration 
issues. Thus, one might conclude that Congress faces textual re-
review of removal decisions in the Court’s recent decision Kucana v. Holder, No. 08-
911 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2010). Citing separation-of-powers concerns, the Court invoked its 
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and rejected a sug-
gested limit on the power of the federal courts to review petitions to reopen removal 
proceedings. 
PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP 3/18/2010  12:47 PM 
416 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:359 
 
strictions when legislating in the exercise of its naturalization 
power, but confronts fewer limits when it regulates immigration. 
We offer several responses. First, at the time of the framing, 
naturalization rules essentially exhausted the category of immigra-
tion policy.243 As we have seen, during the eighteenth century, mar-
ket factors, including the cost and length of the voyage, ensured 
that immigrants were making a permanent commitment to the na-
tion.244 The desire of aliens to hold property would encourage 
speedy naturalization among those who expected to seek their for-
tunes on frontier farms; the rules of naturalization, which deter-
mined the speed and manner in which the rights of citizenship, in-
cluding the right to own property, accrued, in turn, would 
effectively control immigration. Only later in the nineteenth cen-
tury, when the steamship drove down the price of the voyage and 
new immigrants entered an industrial workforce, would it become 
possible to envision a national immigration law that applied to in-
dividuals who could not, or may not desire to claim access to natu-
ralized citizenship.245 Even today, much of what we think of as im-
migration policy—regulating who may come into the country, who 
may stay, and for what duration—simply ensures that certain im-
migrants cannot enjoy the benefits of naturalization without going 
through the procedures established by Congress. 
Second, the breadth of the Framers’ conception of naturalization 
suggests that we should view Congress’s immigration power as a 
subset of its naturalization authority, rather than as a separate 
category. We think the failure to perceive this derivative quality of 
immigration underlies the Court’s invention of the plenary power 
doctrine in Chae Chan Ping.246 The law excluding Chinese nationals 
was said to apply both to new arrivals and to those like the peti-
243 Scholars recognize the need to translate grants of power to take account of tech-
nological change. While the Constitution does not expressly empower Congress to 
establish an Air Force, one might derive authority for such a modern undertaking 
from its power to raise and support an Army and Navy (the two branches of the 
armed forces known to the Framers). See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 
Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1203 (1993). 
244 See supra note 25. 
245 See id. At risk of belaboring the obvious, Africans brought to the United States 
as slaves came against their will and could not later claim citizenship under rules that 
limited naturalization to free white persons. 
246 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581, 609 (1889). 
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tioner who had established residence in the United States and had 
obtained a certificate entitling them to re-enter the country.247 
While he was out of the country in reliance on the certificate, the 
petitioner’s right to re-enter was legislatively curtailed.248 In Fong 
Yue Ting, by contrast, new legislation required all resident Chinese 
laborers to register within one year of the Act’s adoption.249 The 
petitioners were arrested for having failed to register and were sub-
jected to deportation proceedings.250
In both cases, the Court upheld the application of these rules, 
despite their retroactive effect. Although the Court spoke with 
unanimity in Chae Chan Ping, the decision in Fong Yue Ting was 
more closely divided.251 The majority began where it left off in the 
earlier case, by denying that the petitioners had acquired any right 
to remain in the country except on whatever terms Congress chose 
to specify.252 Without a right, the aliens were subject to Congress’s 
plenary control.253 The majority then turned to the terms of the 
247 Id. at 582. The Act prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the United States if 
they had departed before the passage of the Act, even if they had obtained a certifi-
cate under a previous act entitling them to return. Id. The petitioner challenged the 
Act as violating existing treaties between the United States and China and the rights 
vested under those treaties through previous acts. Id. at 599–600. Notably, petitioner 
did not challenge the Act on equal protection grounds. See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae 
Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, in Immigration Stories 7, 15 (David A. Martin & Peter 
H. Schuck eds., 2005) (noting that such a challenge would have failed since the Fifth 
Amendment had not yet been interpreted to prohibit Congress from discriminating 
on the basis of race). 
248 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. 
249 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 699 n.1 (1893). 
250 Id. at 699–704. 
251 Id. at 732 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
252 Id. at 707 (“The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not 
been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests 
upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and 
prevent their entrance into the country.”). 
253 See id. at 713 (“The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting 
international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is 
to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive 
authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial de-
partment has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount 
law of the Constitution, to intervene.”); id. at 713–14 (“The power of Congress, there-
fore, to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from 
the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, or Congress may 
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Constitution to determine whether anything foreclosed deporta-
tion for failure to register.254 Here, the Court reached the crucial 
conclusion that a deportation proceeding was not criminal and did 
not, therefore, trigger the application of the usual panoply of con-
stitutional protections.255 Scholars view Chae Chan Ping and Fong 
Yue Ting as a reflection of the racism and xenophobia of the day.256
We agree with that assessment. But we believe the Court was 
also influenced by its perception that the individual petitioners 
were not entitled to naturalized citizenship under applicable law.257 
In Fong Yue Ting, the Court drew an analogy between deportation 
and exclusion that seemed to emphasize the importance of natu-
ralization: “The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who 
have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming 
citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as abso-
lute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their en-
call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien’s right 
to be in the country has been made by Congress to depend.”). 
254 Id. at 711–14. While the legislation in Chae Chan Ping operated with clear retro-
active effect, that in Fong Yue Ting may present a closer question. One can argue that 
the Chinese laborers, having chosen to remain in the United States after the promul-
gation of the registration law, became fairly subject to the rule imposing deportation 
as a remedy. Yet the aliens in Fong Yue Ting were not involved in acts of continuing 
illegality. Cf. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44–46 (2006) (interpreting 
statute as imposing a permissibly prospective, if somewhat harsher, rule of deporta-
tion for undocumented aliens who chose to continue their illegal presence in the 
United States after the new regime was enacted). 
255 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (“He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law, and the provisions of the Constitution, 
securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”). As noted below, subse-
quent cases have relied on the non-criminal conception of deportation in concluding 
that the ex post facto clause does not restrict Congress’s authority to impose deporta-
tion on a retroactive basis. 
256 Morawetz, supra note 7, at 98, 123 & n.115. 
257 At the time that Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting were decided, the law fore-
closed individuals of Chinese descent from seeking naturalized citizenship. See Lucy 
E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest over Birthright Citizenship, in Immigration 
Stories, supra note 247, at 57–58 (reporting that, by 1882, the federal courts had held, 
and Congress had decreed, that individuals of Chinese descent were not “white per-
sons” for purposes of qualifying for naturalized citizenship). One might attack this 
denial of access to naturalized citizenship as itself retroactive if not for the fact that 
the “white person” requirement had been part of the naturalization law since the 
Founding. 
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trance into the country.”258 On this view, Chinese laborers were 
admitted at Congress’s “sufferance,”259 were not entitled to natu-
ralization, and gained no rights upon establishing residence in the 
United States.260 Just as Congress could exclude new Chinese la-
borers from the country, so too could it exclude those who re-
turned to the country or deport those who remained or failed to 
register. 
The centrality of naturalization issues in Chae Chan Ping and 
Fong Yue Ting highlights an important but often overlooked truth. 
The decision to uphold the power of Congress was influenced by 
the Court’s perception that Chinese laborers did not qualify to 
claim naturalized citizenship. The absence of any prospect of natu-
ralization explains why the Court treated all Chinese laborers as a 
group, lumping together those who had never been to the country 
with those who had established a residence in the United States 
and secured a certificate enabling them to return. The Court ap-
parently took the view that residence, without any prospect of 
naturalized citizenship, left the Chinese subject to Congress’s 
power to exclude. The dissenting Justices apparently recognized 
that the petitioners’ inability to secure naturalized citizenship was 
doing some of the work for the majority; Justice Field expressed 
doubt that the Court would uphold similar treatment of resident 
aliens from England, Germany, France, and Ireland,261 aliens who 
were presumptively entitled to naturalization. 
We do not believe that the Court’s unspoken premise can with-
stand careful scrutiny: Congress simply cannot escape the con-
straints of the naturalization clause by creating a class of individu-
als to whom the protections of the clause do not apply. We reach 
this conclusion for two reasons. First, as a logical matter, the deci-
sion of Congress to deny Chinese nationals access to naturalized 
258 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707; see also id. at 724 (describing petitioners as aliens 
who have “taken no steps toward becoming citizens” and are “incapable of becoming 
such under the naturalization laws”). 
259 Id. at 723–24. 
260 See id. at 716 (“Chinese persons not born in this country have never been recog-
nized as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the natu-
ralization laws.”). 
261 Id. at 750 (Field, J., dissenting); see id. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissenting); see also 
Brief for the Respondent at 49, United States v. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) 
(No. 1345) (describing the “obnoxious subjects of China”). 
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citizenship is itself an exercise of power conferred in the naturaliza-
tion clause. To the extent that the naturalization clause (or another 
provision of the Constitution) limits congressional power, it would 
make little sense to conclude that Congress can evade constitu-
tional limits by excluding certain individuals from the protection of 
the clause. Second, we note that the natural-born children of Chi-
nese nationals (and other aliens present in the United States) are 
themselves regarded as citizens of the United States.262 The citizen-
ship of children born to aliens resident in the United States offers 
an additional reason to regard residence as a factor that triggers 
limits on congressional power to exclude.263 Everyone who estab-
lishes a lawful residence in the United States, whether on the im-
migration track or the naturalization track, should thus enjoy the 
assurances of prospectivity and uniformity embedded in the natu-
ralization clause. 
Finally, we note that the issues of law posed by resident aliens, 
even the illegal or undocumented, do not fall into categorically 
separate bodies of immigration and naturalization law.264 Consider 
the representative example of Jagdish Chadha, the alien whose 
case led to the invalidation of the one-House veto.265 Mr. Chadha 
came to the United States on a student visa, an immigration status 
that assumes he would return to his home in Kenya to practice 
dentistry. But Mr. Chadha overstayed his visa, hoping to establish a 
dental practice in the United States. Although he was put in line 
for deportation, the Attorney General determined that Chadha de-
served discretionary relief and the opportunity to switch to the 
naturalization track and secure a permanent resident visa. It was 
262 See Wong Kim Ark v. United States, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898). 
263 To be sure, the federal courts have long rejected the argument that deportation of 
the alien parent operates as a de facto deportation of the citizen child. For a summary 
and critique, see Sonia Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of 
International Law, 21 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 213, 259–60 (2003). Yet arguments for the 
preservation of an intact family continue to inform immigration policy toward the 
alien parents of citizen children. 
264 One can make two responses to the argument against the extension of naturaliza-
tion precepts. First, as a practical matter, the lines of separation between immigration 
and naturalization may not be quite so hard and fast as some assume. Even today, 
most resident aliens on the immigration track, assuming they have played by the rules, 
remain eligible to switch to the naturalization track. Much immigration law thus influ-
ences the choices of prospective candidates for naturalized citizenship. 
265 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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that grant of discretionary relief that was restored when the Su-
preme Court invalidated the one-House veto.266 Chadha’s case illus-
trates the fluid boundary between the rules of immigration and 
naturalization and shows that lawful residence in the United States, 
on whatever terms, should trigger the application of the rules of 
prospectivity, uniformity, and transparency that the Framers em-
bedded in the naturalization clause. We now propose to define 
those rules more formally. 
B. No Retroactive Changes in the Law 
Among other lessons, the text and early history of the naturali-
zation clause demonstrate that the Framers of the Constitution 
meant for Congress to establish a public and relatively stable re-
gime for the integration of new citizens into the country. Not only 
did the Framers display consistent concern with ensuring the pro-
spective development of rules of naturalization, but the members 
of Congress in the early Republic consistently acted as if norms of 
prospectivity were guiding their legislative work.267 Both with the 
establishment of the first naturalization law in 1790 and with the 
changes adopted in 1795 to lengthen the required period of resi-
dence, Congress took care to protect those already residing in the 
country. This solicitude for resident aliens reflects a general under-
standing that those who immigrated to the country under a particu-
lar naturalization regime were entitled to the benefit of existing 
law. The only legislation in which an early Congress departed from 
a strict regime of prospectivity—adopted during the crisis of 
1798—was ameliorated after an appeal to the Constitution’s 
prospectivity requirement and was repealed when cooler heads 
prevailed and norms of prospectivity were restored. 
We view the requirement of an established rule, operating in fa-
vor of the reliance interests of resident aliens, as providing the ba-
sis for a challenge to certain features of the so-called plenary power 
266 In the end, Mr. Chadha became a naturalized citizen and recently won an award 
for his contributions to the field of dental education from Louisiana State University. 
District Reports, The Key (Int’l Coll. of Dentists), 2006, at 50, 73, available at 
http://www.usaicd.org/information/theKEY/The_Key_2006web.pdf; Lena Williams, 
Faces Behind Famous Cases, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1985, at C1. 
267 See supra Section III.B. 
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doctrine. Under the terms of this much-criticized doctrine,268 the 
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad power to 
rework the rules of immigration and naturalization.269 This power 
corresponds to the Framers’ perception that Congress was to have 
broad authority over immigration and could foreclose certain 
classes of aliens from access to naturalized citizenship. In addition, 
the Court has upheld the application of new immigration rules on a 
retrospective basis.270 In this section, we sketch the evolution of the 
plenary power doctrine and show that it conflicts with the require-
ment of prospectivity that inheres in the obligation that Congress 
establish a rule of naturalization. 
Following the conclusion in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, 
the non-criminal characterization of deportation proceedings has 
played a crucial role in denying resident aliens the benefit of norms 
of prospectivity. Thus, in Galvan v. Press, the Court confronted a 
law that made membership in the Communist Party a basis for de-
portation proceedings.271 At the time of the alien’s membership in 
the Party, such affiliation was not forbidden; indeed, he had left the 
Party before the new Party-member deportation provision took ef-
fect.272 In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Court appeared to 
acknowledge strong arguments in favor of reading some assurance 
of prospectivity into the Constitution.273 In the end, though, the 
268 See Neuman, Strangers, supra note 3, at 134–37 (noting the uncertainty in defin-
ing the plenary power doctrine and scholars’ critique of the doctrine); see also Moto-
mura, supra note 1, at 1626 (explaining that “[c]ourts have been reluctant to apply 
constitutional norms and principles to test the validity of subconstitutional immigra-
tion law” because of the “judicially created plenary power doctrine, under which 
Congress and the executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority in immi-
gration matters”); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Gold Door, 1993 
Wis. L. Rev. 965, 965 (criticizing continued reliance on the plenary power doctrine). 
269 Nancy Morawetz notes that the landmark cases establishing the plenary power 
doctrine in immigration were issued within years of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896). These cases “built on the idea that race could be determinative of a group’s 
ability to assimilate as Americans.” See Morawetz, supra note 7, at 98 n.9 (referring to 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) and Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893)); see also Legomsky, Plenary Power, supra 
note 6, at 288–89. 
270 See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 611, 
615–16 (2006); see also infra notes 271–74. 
271 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 523 (1954). 
272 Id. at 523–24. 
273 Id. at 530–31 (noting that “[i]n light of the expansion of the concept of substan-
tive due process as a limitation upon all powers of Congress, even the war power, 
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Court concluded that the “slate [was] not clean” and that the 
“whole volume” of history supporting the plenary power of Con-
gress over immigration required reaffirmation of the “unbroken 
rule of this Court that [the ex post facto clause] has no application 
to deportation.”274
One can fairly ask how much of Galvan v. Press remains good 
law. Although members of the Court continue to cite the case as 
support for the plenary power doctrine,275 others have taken pains 
to avoid interpretations of the law that would produce retroactive 
deportation effects. In INS v. St. Cyr,276 the Court considered chal-
lenges to provisions of two important immigration reform laws of 
the 1990s. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), subjected many aliens, 
including lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to deportation for 
crimes committed before the legislation was passed.277 The Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS, now the Department of 
Homeland Security) took the position that 440(d) of AEDPA 
eliminated discretionary waiver from deportation for commission 
of certain offenses under 212(c).278 Advocates challenged this de-
termination on both statutory and due process grounds.279
much could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the due process 
clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to 
Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens. And since the intrinsic 
consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be 
said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legisla-
tion, should be applied to deportation” (internal citations omitted)). 
274 Id. at 531. 
275 See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1180 n.2 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 547 n.9 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
276 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
277 See Morawetz, supra note 7, at 99 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42, 50 U.S.C.) [here-
inafter AEDPA] and Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 
3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA]). 
278 Memorandum from David A. Martin, General Counsel, Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service to all Regional Counsels and District Counsels (Apr. 26, 1996), cited 
in Nancy Morawetz, INS v. St. Cyr: The Campaign to Preserve Court Review and 
Stop Retroactive Deportation Laws, in Immigration Stories, supra note 247, at 279, 
283 n.11. 
279 Nancy Morawetz, INS v. St. Cyr: The Campaign to Preserve Court Review and 
Stop Retroactive Deportation Laws, in Immigration Stories, supra note 247, at 279, 
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The Supreme Court considered two elements of this challenge. 
First, the Court evaluated the government’s argument that the 
1996 amendments foreclosed federal courts from exercising habeas 
jurisdiction to review the statutory bar to discretionary relief.280 In-
voking the doctrine of constitutional doubt, the Court held that the 
statute failed to contain the requisite clear statement of congres-
sional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.281 Second, the Court ad-
dressed the substantive question of whether the amendments could 
be applied retroactively, thus depriving the petitioner of discre-
tionary 212(c) relief that had been available when he committed 
and pled guilty to his deportable offense.282 Citing the interpretative 
canon that presumes Congress does not intend retroactive applica-
tion of its laws,283 the Court held that the law did not bar discre-
tionary review.284 Yet the Court was quick to note that there was no 
constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws, as long as Con-
gress spoke with the requisite clarity.285
While St. Cyr limits retroactive application of laws to some de-
gree, it does little to protect aliens’ reliance interests from a deter-
284–97 (describing the methods used to challenge the transitional and permanent 
rules under AEDPA and IIRIRA). 
280 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292–93. 
281 Id. at 298–99. Congress responded by enacting an Act with such a clear statement. 
The REAL ID Act of 2005 “foreclose[s] the use of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to obtain review 
of removal orders and their implementation.” Medellin-Reyes v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 
721, 722 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Jaber v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 223, 230 (6th Cir. 2007). 
In any case, interpretation of the amendments as a bar to judicial review of pure ques-
tions of law, such as that presented by St. Cyr, might give rise to constitutional ques-
tions. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300–01 (suspension clause might be implicated if the Court 
interpreted the amendments to strip habeas jurisdiction). 
282 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293. 
283 Id. at 316 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1993) 
(“[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurispru-
dence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary 
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know 
what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should 
not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct 
should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place 
has timeless and universal human appeal.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted))). 
284 Id. at 326. 
285 Id. at 316 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272–73) (“Requiring clear intent assures 
that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroac-
tive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the counter-
vailing benefits.”). 
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mined Congress. Scholars have structured arguments against retro-
active application of immigration laws on due process grounds.286 
Our suggested reading of the naturalization clause complements 
this scholarship, but bases its rejection of retroactivity on the re-
quirement that Congress establish a uniform rule. This suggested 
reformulation of the plenary power doctrine permits Congress to 
change the law as applied to aliens, so long as it complies with 
norms of prospectivity. It thus corresponds to the best reading of 
the naturalization clause and to the distrust of retroactive legisla-
tion that informed the immigration law of the early Republic and 
the late nineteenth century.287
Such a reformulated doctrine might better explain certain fea-
tures of the constitutional law of immigration and naturalization. 
To begin with, the Court’s decisions provide some support for the 
proposed reading of the naturalization clause as a source of quali-
fied power over aliens. Thus, in INS v. Chadha, the Court charac-
terized the clause as providing Congress with “unreviewable au-
thority” over the regulation of aliens, subject to the requirement 
that Congress choose a “constitutionally permissible means of im-
plementing that power.”288 Our view of the naturalization clause 
helps to give content to these constitutionally permissible means. 
In addition, by drawing on the naturalization clause, the Court 
could identify limits on retroactivity without questioning its earlier 
conclusion that deportation was a non-criminal proceeding to 
which the ex post facto clause does not apply. Such an approach 
would occasion less doctrinal dislocation. Finally, the suggested 
approach would provide a firmer foundation for some results that 
courts have been reaching in other ways. For instance, in assessing 
286 See generally Morawetz, supra note 7. 
287 See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559–60 (1884) (invoking the pre-
sumption against retroactivity, among other considerations, in refusing to give retro-
active effect to a requirement that Chinese nationals obtain a certificate to gain re-
entry into the country); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 633–34 (1888) 
(applying Chew Heong); see also United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 535 (1955) 
(“The whole development of this general savings clause, its predecessors accompany-
ing each of the recent codifications in the field of immigration and naturalization, 
manifests a well-established congressional policy not to strip aliens of advantages 
gained under prior laws.”); cf. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 61–62 
(1892) (noting that aliens domiciled in the United States enjoy some citizenship-like 
privileges and immunities). 
288 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983). 
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whether an individual had qualified for derivative citizenship, the 
Second Circuit has applied the law in effect as of the date of the 
alien’s completion of the last step necessary to qualify.289 Our sug-
gested understanding of the naturalization clause provides an en-
tirely straightforward basis for such results. 
Perhaps most intriguingly, our approach suggests an alternative 
basis for the commonplace, but nonetheless puzzling, conclusion 
that the Constitution’s protections do not apply to aliens without 
property or presence in the United States. One sees this conclusion 
frequently stated in territorial terms, as if the Constitution applies 
only to immigration matters that take place inside the territory of 
the United States.290 One also sees it reflected in the cases that af-
ford resident aliens greater rights to contest deportation than non-
resident aliens have to contest their exclusion from the United 
States.291 Yet such a territorially restrictive view of the Constitution 
has become increasingly difficult to square with the Court’s recent 
decision that the habeas non-suspension clause applies to aliens de-
tained at Guantanamo Bay. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court in-
validated congressional restrictions on the right of aliens to seek 
habeas review of their confinement, despite the fact that the deten-
tion occurred outside the sovereign territory of the United States 
and the aliens in question lacked any property or presence in the 
United States.292 If constitutional limits apply to the government 
when it imposes detention overseas (as one of us has argued previ-
ously),293 then it may be difficult to contend that the Constitution’s 
289 See Ashton v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (“To determine whether 
Ashton obtained U.S. citizenship as a result of his mother’s naturalization, we apply 
the law in effect when Ashton fulfilled the last requirement for derivative citizen-
ship.”); see also Hernandez de Anderson v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that law eliminating suspension of deportation for aliens who had been con-
victed of certain crimes did not apply to alien who sought naturalization and suspen-
sion before the act took effect). 
290 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269, 274–75 (1990). 
291 Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 
1661, 1670–71 (2000) [hereinafter Neuman, Immigration Law] (citing Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537, 542, 544 (1950)). 
292 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008). 
293 See James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on 
Terror, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 497, 499 (2006). 
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protections apply only to aliens with some presence in the coun-
try.294
Rather than thinking of constitutional protections in territorial 
terms (and as presumptively inapplicable to government activity 
outside the United States), it may be more fruitful to evaluate the 
rights of aliens in terms of the residential trigger of the prospectiv-
ity assurances in the naturalization clause. As we have seen, the 
Framers regarded the norm of prospectivity as applying to aliens 
who had established a physical residence in the United States in re-
liance on an existing framework for admission to citizenship. The 
focus on residence reflected historical practice; under every public 
law of naturalization with which the Framers were familiar, a speci-
fied period of residence was required before the alien could apply 
for access to citizenship.295 Once a residential presence was estab-
lished, retroactive changes in the framework for obtaining citizen-
ship were viewed as inconsistent with the nation’s obligations un-
der the Constitution. Building on these views of the Framers, one 
can fashion a fairly straightforward distinction between the rights 
owed to aliens who establish a residential presence here and those, 
outside the country, who have yet to make their way to the United 
States. Non-resident aliens would appear to fall into a group to 
which Congress owes no obligation of prospectivity under the 
naturalization clause. Yet the same group might well claim rights 
under the habeas non-suspension clause or other constitutional 
provisions that protect individuals from government conduct over-
seas. By grounding its analysis in the residential focus of the natu-
ralization clause, the Court could justify a territorial distinction be-
tween the duties owed to resident and non-resident aliens and 
avoid the anomalies of viewing other rights-protective provisions 
of the Constitution as territorially restricted. 
294 To be sure, the Court limited its decision to a conclusion that the habeas non-
suspension clause has full effect in Guantanamo Bay. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 
2262. But it remains uncertain what weight to give to this limitation; after all, the 
Court had no reason to consider other provisions of the Constitution. For a character-
istically rich and insightful exploration of these issues, see Gerald L. Neuman, The 
Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 (2009) 
[hereinafter Neuman, Extraterritorial Constitution]. 
295 As explained in Parts I and II, residence played a role in Parliament’s naturaliza-
tion act of 1740, in the laws adopted by the newly independent states, and in Con-
gress’s naturalization act of 1790. 
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C. No Private Naturalization Bills 
Complementing the ban on retroactive legislation, the Framers’ 
decision to empower Congress to “establish an uniform rule of 
naturalization” forecloses private naturalization bills. While the 
private bill system, coupled with denization by the Crown, was an 
acknowledged feature of colonial systems of naturalization, the 
Framers specifically rejected the exercise of case-by-case legislative 
control.296 As we have seen, such case-by-case naturalization deci-
sions, like other forms of legislative adjudication, were associated 
in the minds of the Framers with the payment of exorbitant fees 
and the production of inherently arbitrary and discriminatory re-
sults.297 We think the Framers rejected this system in favor of natu-
ralization pursuant to a public law of general applicability. Such a 
transparent and uniform model of naturalization would best give 
effect to the Framers’ goal of “peopling” North America through 
relatively liberal immigration policies. Moreover, such an interpre-
tation best accounts for the Framers’ decision to drop an early ver-
sion of the clause, which empowered Congress simply to regulate, 
and to adopt a later draft that specifically required the establish-
ment of a uniform rule. 
In contending that the naturalization clause forecloses private 
bills, we draw support from the action of early Congresses. As we 
have seen, the First Congress deliberately rejected a petition for 
the adoption of a private naturalization bill, apparently on consti-
tutional grounds. Later Congresses held to this position. Despite a 
flood of petitions, decrying the unfairness of the 1798 naturaliza-
tion law, Congress declined to adopt private bills.298 Rather, as we 
have seen, Congress chose to repeal the harsh 1798 law, and to 
adopt curative legislation of general applicability that would pro-
vide relief across the board to all deserving applicants.299 Congress 
296 One sees evidence of the rejection of case-by-case administration in the Constitu-
tion’s requirement that Congress adopt public and uniform laws of general applica-
tion and in the rejection of naturalization petitions by the members of the First Con-
gress. See supra notes 175–82 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra p. 388. On the abuses inherent in private legislation, see Comment, The 
Constitutionality of Private Acts of Congress, 49 Yale L.J. 712, 714–15 (1940) (noting 
maladministration and widespread abuses at various times in the nation’s history). 
298 For an account of the petitions to Congress in the late 1790s and early 1800s, see 
Smith, supra note 177, at 112 (describing the flow of petitions as a “minor flood”). 
299 See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text. 
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refrained from adopting any private legislation until 1839, a full 
fifty years after the founding. Even then, the bill simply corrected 
the naturalization record of the petitioner to state his name cor-
rectly; it did not actually confer citizenship on the petitioner.300 
Perhaps as a consequence, the congressional record from the date 
of the Senate’s passage of the bill does not reflect any debate about 
its constitutionality.301
Today, Congress plays a more active role in the consideration 
and adoption of private immigration and naturalization laws. These 
bills generally operate like the decrees of a court of equity, reliev-
ing the petitioner from the perceived harshness of the general 
rule.302 The form of relief can vary; some laws waive the application 
of a quota and admit a particular immigrant to the country while 
others directly confer citizenship.303 One student of the legislative 
process highlights its similarity to the practice of a court of equity 
by emphasizing the importance of identifying a precedent for relief 
among congressional records.304 While the number of petitions for 
such legislation has ebbed and flowed over time, recent years have 
witnessed a general downward trend from 7293 petitions in the 
90th Congress (1967–1968) to 2866 in 1972 to 194 in the 100th 
Congress (1987–1988). Of the petitions received, only twenty-one 
private bills were adopted in the 1987–1988 period.305
Whatever the constitutional justification for private naturaliza-
tion bills,306 it seems unlikely that they could be successfully chal-
300 See An Act for the relief of Dr. John Campbell White, ch. 23, 6 Stat. 750 (1839). 
301 See Cong. Globe, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 143 (1839). 
302 See 117 Cong. Rec. 10,143 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Peter Rodino (New Jersey)) 
(describing private bills as providing an “extraordinary remedy” for those facing “un-
usual hardship”). 
303 Congress conferred citizenship unconditionally as early as 1912. See An Act for 
the relief of Eugene Prince, 37 Stat. 1346 (1912). See generally Maguire, supra note 
37, at 3 (describing types of naturalization bills). 
304 See Maguire, supra note 37, at 3–4. 
305 Id. at 7. 
306 One commentator argues that the uniformity requirement applies only to geo-
graphic uniformity and thus neither requires uniform treatment of individual peti-
tioners nor rules out private bills. See Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1684, 1685 (1966) (viewing private bills as “necessary and proper” to the effec-
tuation of congressional power over naturalization). But note that the clause in ques-
tion refers to a single uniform rule, made applicable to all prospective citizens. Even if 
uniformity primarily addressed state-to-state variability, the requirement of a single 
rule seemingly forecloses the disparate treatment of similarly situated candidates. See 
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lenged in federal court. For starters, when Congress confers a pri-
vate benefit on individual petitioners, one has difficulty identifying 
a party that would have standing to challenge the benefit so con-
ferred.307 Justiciability doctrines thus bar most conceivable chal-
lenges.308 Even if a court were inclined to hear such a case, private 
naturalization bills almost invariably operate to provide relief to 
the petitioner. Courts might understandably prefer to dodge litiga-
tion that seeks to challenge the conferral of such congressional 
benefits. From the perspective of private litigants, then, private 
bills may appear to constitute a victimless constitutional infringe-
ment and a necessary safeguard against harsh results. Indeed, some 
argue that private bill practice encourages the submission of peti-
tions that help to inform Congress about needed legal reforms.309
Crosskey, supra note 76, at 487 (arguing that the textual requirement of a “uniform 
rule” was unnecessary if the Framers simply wanted to ensure that naturalization laws 
were the same throughout the states); see also Hertz, supra note 124, at 113–15. 
307 For a summary of standing doctrine and the requirement that individual litigants 
suffer some concrete personal injury, see James E. Pfander, Principles of Federal Ju-
risdiction 30–34 (2006). 
308 To be sure, a congressional grant of naturalized citizenship might be contested in 
the context of a dispute over rights in real property. So long as common law alien 
property disabilities remain intact, a party might challenge the right of an improperly 
naturalized citizen to secure or convey good title to land. In addition, one alien might 
argue for judicial relief from some aspect of the law by pointing to the passage of pri-
vate legislation on behalf of another alien in the same situation. It seems highly 
unlikely that a court would grant relief on such a basis. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 
U.S. 875, 876 (1988) (rejecting equal protection-based naturalization claims of Fili-
pino veterans of World War II, despite fact that others in a similar situation had 
gained naturalization rights). 
309 For an argument that the private bill system benefits immigrants, see Kati L. 
Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private Immigration Bills and 
Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 273, 274 (2004) (con-
tending that private bills serve an “informational” purpose by highlighting “necessary 
changes to rigid or unintended aspects of the public law”); see also Maguire, supra 
note 37, at 5. Yet a congressional refusal to adopt private bills would not deprive 
Congress of the information supplied by private petitions for relief; the nation’s early 
experience with curative legislation reveals that Congress can respond to claims of 
unfair application of the law by adopting rules of lenity that apply across the board, 
instead of doing so case by case. For evidence that widespread petitioning persisted in 
the early Republic despite Congress’s refusal to adopt private bills, see Franklin, su-
pra note 186, at 169–70 (describing petitions to Congress in 1824 and the adoption of 
curative legislation in response); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration and the Right to 
Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 667, 697–711 (2003) (describing petitions to Congress in 
the period 1798–1804); cf. Griffith, supra, at 293 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank’s ac-
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Accepting that arguments can be made for private bills, their 
benign appearance may mask a more malignant reality. The losers 
in a private bill process are those who qualify for relief on the same 
basis as the beneficiaries of private legislation but lack the clout or 
connections necessary to secure their own bill. The Framers sought 
to ensure that the benefits of naturalization were available on an 
equal basis to all similarly situated persons and for this reason re-
quired Congress to establish a uniform rule. The passage of private 
legislation undercuts the goal of transparency and uniformity in fa-
vor of the deal-making and log-rolling of the legislative process. 
Perhaps it comes as no surprise, given the history of private natu-
ralization bills in England, that seven members of Congress in the 
ABSCAM scandal were convicted of accepting bribes in exchange 
for an agreement to push private naturalization bills.310 Congress 
should end the practice; indeed, some hopeful evidence suggests 
that Congress has increasingly assigned the exercise of discretion to 
executive branch officials and has moved to limit the number of 
private bills.311
Even if the federal courts will have no occasion to invalidate pri-
vate naturalization bills, our interpretation of the naturalization 
clause has a role to play in understanding the separation of powers 
doctrine in the immigration context. Indeed, our account of the 
limited legislative role dovetails nicely with Justice Powell’s con-
curring opinion in INS v. Chadha, a case best known for invalidat-
ing the one-House veto.312 Powell’s opinion offers a useful summary 
of the concerns that gave rise to the prohibition of congressional 
adjudication and private legislation in the naturalization context. 
Powell noted that “[o]ne abuse that was prevalent during the Con-
federation was the exercise of judicial power by the state legisla-
knowledgement that a class of cases can be better dealt with through “[public] legisla-
tion” than through a private bill). 
310 See Griffith, supra note 309, at 302. 
311 On the transfer of congressional discretion to the executive branch, see INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983); Griffith, supra note 309, at 278–79 (tracing the 
transfer of discretionary authority from Congress to the executive branch). Griffith 
reports that, as of 2004, only one person had obtained relief from the relatively harsh 
provisions of AEDPA. Id. at 276, 293. 
312 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919. As noted above, Chadha sought judicial review of the 
agency’s decision to give effect to the House’s determination. See supra notes 265–66 
and accompanying text. 
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tures,” and that the Framers were familiar with the dangers of such 
a practice.313 In order to avoid such dangers, the Framers had cre-
ated a tripartite system dependent on a separation of the powers of 
the three branches.314 In addition to these structural protections, 
Powell noted that the bill of attainder clause, Article I, Section 9, 
also lent support to the “Framers’ concern that trial by legislature 
lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power.”315 In 
the end, Powell concluded that congressional exercise of an adjudi-
catory role lacks the sort of checks that “prevent it from arbitrarily 
depriving [aliens] of the right to remain in this country.”316
Although his account of the Framers’ distrust of legislative adju-
dication attracted some sympathy, the other Justices leveled an 
important criticism at Justice Powell’s approach. Powell based his 
conclusion on general separation-of-powers principles, arguing that 
such principles foreclosed Congress from playing an adjudicatory 
role.317 But as the majority and dissent alike observed,318 the federal 
courts often lacked statutory authority to review certain discre-
tionary decisions of the Attorney General relating to relief from 
deportation. The absence of any judicial role raised doubts about 
Powell’s assertion that Congress had arrogated to itself a function 
that was inherently judicial. But Powell could have sidestepped 
that concern by deploying the naturalization clause. The clause 
forecloses Congress from exercising case-by-case authority in im-
migration matters, quite without regard to whether such individual 
decisions can best be conceptualized as administrative or judicial in 
character. On this view, the Constitution would require Congress 
to delegate the application of standards to other branches, thus 
barring Congress from performing the work itself or retaining a 
power to review the work of other branches (as it did in Chadha). 
313 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 961 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “Jefferson observed 
that members of the General Assembly in his native Virginia had not been prevented 
from assuming judicial power, and ‘[t]hey have accordingly in many instances decided 
rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy’” (quoting The Federalist 
No. 48, at 336 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, 
Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (London ed. 1787)))). 
314 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 966. 
317 Id. at 962. 
318 Id. at 957 n.22; id. at 1001–02 (White, J., dissenting). 
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D. No Public Rights Doctrine 
Our criticisms of the plenary power doctrine and the adoption of 
private legislation lead us to question the application of the “public 
rights” doctrine to issues of immigration and naturalization law. In 
general, the public rights doctrine holds that Congress may assign 
disputes involving the federal government to Article I tribunals, 
the judges of which lack the salary and tenure protections required 
by Article III.319 In a leading discussion, albeit one not essential to 
its holding, the Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson included im-
migration issues on the list of disputes in the public rights cate-
gory.320 In doing so, the Court relied upon plenary power cases 
from the nineteenth century.321 In other words, the Court has taken 
the position that Congress’s plenary power over issues of immigra-
319 An elaborate jurisprudence now governs the power of Congress to assign federal 
claims to non-Article III courts. For descriptions and criticisms of the doctrine, see 
Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Federal Power 
53–82 (2d ed. 1990); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article 
III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 85 
(1988). The Court first gave voice to the public rights exception in 1855, upholding the 
power of Congress to provide for the issuance of a distress warrant on the basis of ex-
ecutive branch, rather than judicial branch, determination of the factual predicate for 
a claim that an individual owed money to the federal government. See Murray’s Les-
see v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (identifying 
“matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judi-
cial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determi-
nation, but which [C]ongress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the 
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper”). Thus, the doctrine refers to the 
“public right” to recover money owed to government. 
320 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932). The Crowell Court included 
the following within the public rights category: “interstate and foreign commerce, 
taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, 
pensions, and payments to veterans.” Id. at 51. 
321 In justifying the inclusion of immigration cases within the public rights doctrine, 
see id. at 51 n.13, the Court’s accompanying footnote referred to United States v. Ju 
Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905). In Ju Toy, the Court refused to order a judicial deter-
mination of a claim of citizenship by one detained at the border. Ju Toy, in turn, re-
lied on Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), and Fong Yue Ting 
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893), two plenary power cases. The application of 
the public rights doctrine thus grows out of the Court’s conception that Congress has 
plenary power over immigration matters. Professor Richard Fallon has identified an 
explicit link between the plenary power doctrine and the view that immigration issues 
present matters of public right that can be consigned to non-Article III tribunals, al-
though he questions the persuasiveness of that conclusion. See Fallon, supra note 14, 
at 967. 
PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP 3/18/2010  12:47 PM 
434 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 96:359 
 
tion and naturalization law includes a power to assign the final 
resolution of disputes over the application of the rules to non-
Article III tribunals and curtail the federal judicial role. 
Relying on the public rights/plenary power decisions, Congress 
has assigned the determination of a broad range of immigration 
matters, including initial entry and removal decisions, to adminis-
trative agencies. Immigrants seeking judicial review of these 
agency determinations face the usual sorts of constraints imposed 
by administrative law.322 Congress sometimes goes further, as it did 
in the AEDPA and IIRIRA, curtailing all judicial review by giving 
binding effect to the agency’s determination.323 The perceived ab-
sence of any substantive constitutional constraints on Congress’s 
power over immigration matters contributes to the perception that 
Article III courts have no distinctive role to play.324 Or, to put it a 
slightly different way, if Congress can deny entry into the country 
and citizenship altogether, then perhaps it can confer these privi-
leges on whatever terms it chooses, and limit access to judicial re-
view.325 One version of this idea was captured in the Court’s notion 
that whatever Congress prescribes “is due process as far as the 
alien denied entry is concerned.”326
Yet despite occasional assertions to the contrary, the public 
rights doctrine provides little justification for the curtailment of ju-
322 For an overview of the administrative law issues in immigration and asylum cases, 
see Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the 
Limits to Consistency, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 413 (2007). 
323 For a description of the jurisdictional curtailment in AEDPA and IIRIRA, see 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 Cornell L. 
Rev. 369, 380–84 (2006). See generally Neuman, Immigration Law, supra note 291, at 
1695 (noting, among other things, the restrictions on judicial review of orders for re-
moval of deportable aliens in the two laws). 
324 As Professor Daniel Meltzer observed, it seems odd to suggest that aliens may 
lack substantive constitutional rights but possess a right to judicial review. Meltzer, 
supra note 16, at 2571. 
325 See Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative 
State, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 30 n.162 (2002) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391, 399 & n.2 (1938)), “which characterized deportation as ‘revocation of a 
privilege voluntarily granted’”; Milton M. Carrow, The Background of Administrative 
Law 21, 62 (1948), which characterized immigration issues as involving the loss of 
government privileges or benefits; J. Roland Pennock, Administration and the Rule 
of Law 163 (1941), which concluded that immigration cases have received only limited 
judicial review because they fall into the broad category of “suits arising out of gratui-
ties or favors granted by the government.”
326 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
PFANDER _WARDON_PREPP 3/18/2010  12:47 PM 
2010] Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution 435 
 
dicial review in the immigration arena.327 Although we often think 
of the public rights doctrine as a monolithic reference to any litiga-
tion that involves the federal government as a party,328 the doctrine 
actually consists of two separate strands. In one strand, individuals 
pursue claims for the payment of government benefits, such as the 
invalid pension claims that troubled the circuit courts in Hayburn’s 
Case and the social security claims that many disabled Americans 
file today.329 In a second strand, exemplified by Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.,330 individuals seek to recoup 
the losses they suffer through the allegedly unlawful conduct of the 
government: taxes wrongly collected, property wrongly taken, gov-
ernment contracts breached, search or arrest warrants improperly 
executed, persons wrongly detained or imprisoned.331 These matters 
may give rise to litigation with the federal government or with its 
individual agencies or officers depending on the forms of action 
and jurisdictional grants available to the federal courts. 
These two strands of the public rights doctrine rest on different 
foundations and provide different justifications for the exercise of 
congressional control. In the case of government benefits, Con-
gress, exercising its appropriations power, has the power to retain 
for itself the task of distributing funds.332 Alternatively, Congress 
can transfer the decision about the distribution of government lar-
gesse to a government agency, as it did, for example, with the dis-
327 Recent cases find that the judicial role has survived legislation that appears to 
have been designed to immunize agency decisions from federal judicial oversight. See 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 
(2001). 
328 The Court has suggested that the public rights doctrine may extend to certain 
kinds of private litigation that take place in the shadow of a complex regulatory 
scheme. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985). 
329 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). For an account of the litigation, 
see Pfander, supra note 14, at 699–704. 
330 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
331 In each of these exemplary cases, the individual could claim an invasion of life, 
liberty, or property, the traditional common law triggers of judicial review. 
332 Thus, during the early Republic, Congress considered private money claims 
against the United States through its committees and adopted an appropriations bill 
to pay well-founded claims. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against 
the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of 
Payment, 45 La. L. Rev. 625, 626–27 (1985). 
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tribution of public lands.333 Finally, Congress can give authority to 
the federal courts to hear the matter, provided it has made provi-
sion for the courts to act with the finality that Article III demands. 
If Congress wishes to preserve a measure of control, then it can as-
sign the decision to a legislative court or non-Article III tribunal 
and oversee the benefit determinations of that body. The story of 
veteran benefits in the early Republic follows this pattern; Con-
gress initially empowered the War Department to adjust the claims 
and then transferred them to the courts, albeit without sufficient 
finality to enable the courts to proceed.334 Eventually, Congress 
called upon commissioners to make the initial determination, fol-
lowed by administrative and legislative review.335 The treatment of 
these benefit determinations might provide a predicate for the de-
nial of judicial review over immigration and naturalization matters. 
Along with the benefit strand, the Court has invoked the public 
rights doctrine of Murray’s Lessee as the basis for Congress to by-
pass judicial review.336 But one can question the analogy. The fa-
mous dictum in Murray’s Lessee does not uphold any power in 
Congress to sidestep judicial review altogether (although Congress 
has no obligation to open the courts to a claim against the govern-
ment). Rather, it was a question of timing; judicial review could oc-
cur at the threshold, if the government brought suit to collect the 
333 On the use of executive officers to distribute public lands, see Caleb Nelson, Ad-
judication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 566, 577–80 (2007). 
334 See James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial 
Power in the Early Republic, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 35–40 (2008). 
335 Today, in the areas of social security and veteran’s benefits, Congress has given 
agencies the power to make final benefit decisions, thereby clearing the way for judi-
cial review. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 747 n.492. 
336 For the dictum, suggesting that Congress may grant or withhold a judicial forum, 
see supra note 319. To understand the dictum, one must understand that the statutory 
scheme empowered the government to distrain or seize an individual’s property to 
satisfy a government debt and it gave the government good title to the property on 
the date of the seizure. (This gave the government priority in a race to the debtor’s 
assets; the other creditors had to obtain a judgment first and then seize the property 
in satisfaction.) If the debtor wished to contest the seizure of property on the ground 
that no debt was owed, the common law would furnish a remedy in the form of a suit 
against the marshal. But instead of relying on that common law remedy, the statute in 
question allowed the debtor to post a bond for the value of the property and file suit 
against the government to restrain the seizure and return the property. Thus, the sei-
zure (or bond) would secure the government’s financial interest during orderly litiga-
tion over the legality of the alleged debt. The Court recognized that Congress could 
control the timing, but not the existence, of judicial review. 
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debt, or it could occur after the seizure of property at the suit of 
the debtor. The true lesson of Murray’s Lessee, then, is one of re-
spect for common law remedies as the bedrock source of the right 
to judicial review, coupled with a recognition that Congress neces-
sarily has discretion over the nature and timing of such review. The 
Court tried to make this clear, stressing that Congress cannot 
“withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its na-
ture, is the subject of a suit at the common law.”337 Note that 
Murray’s Lessee involved the seizure of property, the sort of gov-
ernment activity that traditionally gave rise to common law reme-
dies in trespass. Other classic common law remedies include the as-
sumpsit action to challenge the wrongful exaction of taxes, the 
mandamus proceeding to compel government action, and the ha-
beas remedy for wrongful imprisonment or detention.338 As to all of 
these government interactions, Murray’s Lessee suggests that 
common law remedies define the constitutional minimum, even in 
cases involving litigation with the government or its officers that 
fall squarely within the traditional understanding of the public 
rights doctrine. 
Yet the Murray’s Lessee dictum has been misunderstood by 
those who assume that the Court meant to recognize Congress’s 
authority to control not just the timing of judicial review, but also 
its ultimate availability. The Court’s summary of the public rights 
doctrine in Crowell v. Benson provides a good example of the con-
fusion. The Crowell dispute itself involved a matter of private 
rights and the Court took pains to preserve judicial review. Yet in 
summarizing the scope of the public rights doctrine, the Crowell 
majority explained that public rights were matters that Congress 
could reserve to itself, delegate to executive officials, or commit to 
337 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
284 (1856); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due 
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. 524 (2005) 
(tracing the common law origins of the duty of government to provide a right to re-
dress). 
338 On the use of suits against government officers to challenge invasions of life, lib-
erty, and property, see David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive 
Government Wrongs, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Of-
ficial Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396, 399 (1987). On the 
special role of habeas corpus litigation in securing review of the legality of custody in 
immigration, see Neuman, Habeas Corpus, supra note 1. 
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judicial tribunals.339 In support of that proposition, the Court cited a 
case in which the Court concluded that the court of customs ap-
peals was to be regarded as an Article I court to which the judicial 
power of the United States did not extend.340 The Court went on to 
list the proceedings that came within the scope of the public rights 
doctrine, including disputes over immigration, taxation, public 
lands, and veteran benefits.341 The discussion thus mixed the two 
strands of public rights cases together as if they all entailed the 
same measure of congressional control. 
In regulating immigration and naturalization, Congress cannot 
exercise untrammeled control of judicial review under either 
strand of the public rights doctrine. Under the first strand of the 
doctrine, one might argue that Congress can distribute the benefits 
of immigration as it sees fit, granting or withholding the privilege 
of entry and citizenship, transferring discretion to the executive 
branch, or providing for judicial determination of such matters. But 
recall that Congress does not enjoy the power, under the naturali-
zation clause, to grant or withhold the privileges of naturalization 
on a case-by-case basis. Rather, the requirement that Congress es-
tablish a uniform rule precludes such discretionary determinations 
and bars Congress from either adjudicating immigration claims or 
passing private bills to confer rights on particular immigrants. As 
we saw in Part II, early Congresses respected these limits: they re-
frained from passing private legislation and delegated the determi-
nation of discretionary matters to the courts. The 1790 Act called 
for common law courts of record to decide, essentially as a matter 
of discretion since no statutory criteria existed, if the applicant was 
a person of “good moral character.”342 While Congress has broad 
power over immigration, in short, it lacks the sort of power to 
make discretionary decisions that it enjoys over the appropriation 
of government revenues and distribution of government property 
(such as public land).343 Congress can create a framework for the 
339 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). 
340 See id. at 50–51 (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). 
341 Id. at 51. 
342 See supra note 152. 
343 The contrast in constitutional language confirms this conclusion. Compare U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing for Congress to establish a uniform rule of naturali-
zation), with id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress to collect taxes to “pay the 
Debts . . . of the United States”), and id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (empowering Congress to 
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resolution of immigration matters, and can place certain responsi-
bility for the decisions in the executive branch, but cannot diminish 
the judicial role by invoking its own authority to do as it sees fit. 
The second strand of the doctrine holds that Congress can sub-
stitute for, but not displace, common law remedies against gov-
ernment officials. We can begin by acknowledging that aliens can-
not claim a right, at common law, to citizenship by virtue of 
extended residence or good behavior. The common law did not 
recognize a right to citizenship by adverse possession. Yet aliens 
who established a lawful residence in the United States were enti-
tled to the benefit of existing naturalization rules, free from any 
retrospective changes. Judicial intervention may be required to en-
force these constitutional limits on congressional control. More-
over, in the course of administering immigration rules, the federal 
government often takes individuals into custody, either to prevent 
their entry into the country or in connection with deportation pro-
ceedings.344 Individuals subject to custody imposed by executive de-
cree, rather than through judicial process, have long enjoyed the 
right at common law to test the legality of their confinement by fil-
ing a petition for the writ of habeas corpus.345 Viewed within the 
framework of Murray’s Lessee, this common law right to habeas 
corpus suggests that Congress may substitute alternative forms of 
judicial review but cannot foreclose access to Article III courts for 
an evaluation of the legality of custody. 
Much the same conclusion emerges from the non-suspension 
clause, which prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus except in times of invasion or rebellion. As the 
Court explained in Boumediene v. Bush, the non-suspension clause 
operates to guarantee the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or 
an equally effective alternative mode of judicial review.346 Congress 
“dispose of” and make “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States”). Thus, while the naturalization clause 
requires Congress to establish a uniform rule, the spending and property clauses im-
pose no restrictions. 
344 See Neuman, Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 294, at 286 (exploring the 
importance of custody as a predicate for judicial review). 
345 See Neuman, Habeas Corpus, supra note 1, at 985. 
346 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008). For an account of the im-
plications of Boumediene for the extension of constitutional doctrine overseas, see 
Neuman, Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 294, at 268–74. 
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violates the non-suspension clause when it eliminates the habeas 
remedy and substitutes a constitutionally inadequate alternative 
form of relief. Important elements of the Court’s opinion extend to 
the immigration context.347 While the statute at issue in Boumedi-
ene provided for review of legal issues in federal appellate court, it 
did not offer detainees an opportunity to supplement the record 
and obtain a full airing of the facts.348 Accordingly, the Court in-
validated the restrictions on habeas jurisdiction set forth in the 
Military Commissions Act (“MCA”).349 In so doing, the Court ac-
knowledged that the need for searching review was most pressing 
when an individual was confined pursuant to an executive order, 
rather than through the usual processes of criminal law.350 That rea-
soning can—and should—be extended to the immigration context. 
CONCLUSION 
Much has changed since the Constitution was framed in 1787. In 
the pre-industrial world of the early Republic, ownership of land 
was central to the promise of life in the new world and, for immi-
grants, naturalized citizenship was central to the ownership of land. 
Today, by contrast, immigrants are drawn to educational opportu-
nities and well-paying jobs in an industrial economy; ownership of 
land no longer exerts the same attraction, and access to naturalized 
citizenship no longer fully defines the scope of the nation’s immi-
gration policy. Immigrants may come for jobs or for an education 
with every expectation that they will return to their countries of 
origin without seeking naturalized citizenship. Changes in the na-
ture of mobility and work have driven a wedge between the rules 
that govern immigration and those that regulate naturalization. 
347 The Boumediene Court first concluded that the constitutional privilege of seeking 
habeas review extended to Guantanamo detainees. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262. 
Next, the Court considered whether the review that Congress had made available, in 
the D.C. Circuit, served as an adequate substitute for the habeas review that it had 
curtailed. Id. at 2262. 
348 Id. at 2272. 
349 Id. at 2274. 
350 Id. at 2277. Accordingly, the Court found that any substitute for habeas must 
have the means to correct errors in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) 
proceeding, to assess the sufficiency of the government’s showing, to consider rele-
vant exculpatory evidence, and to allow the petitioner to supplement the record on 
review. Id. at 2270. 
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Yet despite the modern gap that now separates immigration and 
naturalization law, the constitutional experience of the early Re-
public has lessons to teach us. Framed at a time when the nation 
welcomed (white) immigrants as prospective citizens, the naturali-
zation Constitution of the early Republic refutes the broadest 
claims of plenary congressional power. Congress was not given un-
trammeled power to regulate (immigration and) naturalization but 
was required to “establish a uniform rule.” Embedded in this pro-
vision were norms of prospectivity, uniformity, and transparency: 
Congress was to act by public law, creating a framework within 
which executive and judicial officers would administer naturaliza-
tion law. Congress was neither to change the rules that apply to 
resident aliens, lawfully present in the United States, nor to exer-
cise case-by-case control of naturalization decisions. 
These conclusions call into question three features of modern 
immigration law, including the much-criticized plenary power doc-
trine. While Congress does enjoy broad power to define the re-
quirements for admission to naturalized citizenship and to limit en-
try into the country, the plenary power doctrine wrongly translates 
this control into unlimited authority over those who have already 
established a residence in the United States. As we have seen, the 
Framers of the Constitution and the drafters of the nation’s first 
naturalization law did not share this view. The early Republic also 
rejected the use of private bills as a mode of conferring naturalized 
citizenship. While the Framers were familiar with this form of 
naturalization, they rejected the practice of private legislation (and 
the inconsistency and corruption such practice encourages) in favor 
of requiring Congress to adopt public laws of general applicability. 
These conclusions leave little room for the operation of a special 
public rights doctrine as a predicate for the restriction of judicial 
review over immigration and naturalization matters. Congress can 
certainly assign immigration matters to non-Article III tribunals 
for initial adjudication, subject to the usual rules that govern judi-
cial review. Congress surely has broad power to regulate and chan-
nel the exercise of judicial oversight. But neither the plenary power 
doctrine nor the nature of Congress’s regulatory authority provides 
a foundation for curtailing the oversight role of the federal courts. 
 
